How Publication Type, Experience, and Ownership Affect Self-Censorship among Moscow Newspaper Journalists by Rodina, Elena, 1982-
HOW PUBLICATION TYPE, EXPERIENCE, AND OWNERSHIP
AFFECT SELF-CENSORSHIP AMONG MOSCOW NEWSPAPER JOURNALISTS
by
ELENA RODINA
A THESIS
Presented to the Department of Russian
and East European Studies
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment of
Master ofArts
June 2010
"How Publication Type, Experience, and Ownership Affect Self-Censorship among
Moscow Newspaper Journalists," a thesis prepared by Elena Rodina in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in the Department of
Russian and East European Studies. This thesis has been approved and accepted by:
Date
ii
Committee in Charge:
Accepted by:
Dr. Caleb Southworth, Chair
Dr. Julie Hessler
Dr. Carol Silverman
Elena A. Rodina
An Abstract of the Thesis of
for the degree of
111
Master of Arts
in the Department of Russian and East European Studies
to be taken June 2010
Title: HOW PUBLICATION TYPE, EXPERIENCE AND OWNERSHIP AFFECT
SELF-CENSORSHIP AMONG MOSCOW NEWSPAPER JOURNALISTS
Approved:
This thesis examines how social and economic factors shape the behavior of
Russian journalists. Although the state does not practice legal censorship today, Western
experts compare Russian media with the Soviet period, and Russia is commonly ranked
in the bottom 10% of all countries in terms of press freedom. While scholars identify
free press as a necessary condition for a democratic society, Russian media are influenced
by flak directed at editors and reporters, which results in self-censorship. The central
question is: What is the relationship between the ownership structure ofthe media, a
reporter's experience, and the occurrence of self-censorship?
A random sample of40 journalists was drawn from ten prominent national
newspapers. Interviews focused on instances when reporters had been asked to remove
facts critical of the government. The data show that self-censorship is significant in
Russian journalism; it comes both from the editors and from the journalists themselves.
CURRICULUM VITAE
NAME OF THE AUTHOR: Elena Rodina
PLACE OF BIRTH: Kazan, Tatarstan, Russia
DATE OF BIRTH: December 21, 1982
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:
University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon
University of Malaga, Malaga, Spain
Kazan State University, Kazan, Russia
DEGREES AWARDED:
Master of Arts, Russian and Eastern European Studies, 2010, University of
Oregon
Bachelor of Arts, Romanic-Germanic Philology, 2004, Kazan State University
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:
Contemporary Russian Printed Press
Urban Subcultures
Ethnic tensions in Russia
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:
Special correspondent, Esquire (Russian edition), Moscow, Russia, 2007-2008
Editor, La Costa magazine, Moscow, Russia, 2007
Correspondent, Ogonek weekly magazine, Moscow, Russia, 2004-2007
Journalist, Linea D'L magazine, Kazan, Russia, 2003-2004
Journalist, Kurazh magazine, Kazan, Russia, 2000-2003
iv
GRANTS, AWARDS AND HONORS:
Best Article Award, Ogonek magazine, for the article "Komandantskii chas"
(The Hour of Comandante), 2006
Best Article Award, Ogonek magazine, for the article "Kak my im pomogli? 40
dnei posle Beslana" (How did we help them? 40 days after the Beslan siege),
2004
v
vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to express my sincere appreciation to my advisor and Committee Chair
Caleb Southworth for his guidance during the preparation of this manuscript. His
expertise was essential to my preparation preceding the writing of this thesis, and his
assistance and suggestions contributed greatly to the strength of this work. I would also
like to acknowledge the contributions ofDepartment Chair Julie Hessler, who has been a
source of inspiration for me during my time at the University of Oregon. I express my
gratitude to Professors Yelaina Kripkov and Katya Hokanson, whose instruction was
invaluable on several occasions, and Professor Jenifer Presto, whose advice and
encouragement has helped me through many academic challenges. Special thanks are due
to Professor Carol Silverman for her encouragement and generous support. I would like
to acknowledge Professor Keli Yerian for her insightful comments on the manuscript.
I am also very thankful to the journalists of the Russian edition of Esquire
magazine, and its editor-in-chief, Philipp Bakhtin, for being great colleagues and friends.
Working with Esquire team was one ofmy greatest professional experiences.
Finally, I am extremely grateful to the Russian and East European Studies Center
for awarding me a Graduate Teaching Fellowship, which provided me with the
opportunity to write this thesis. Special thanks to fellow REESC students, faculty and
staff for all their efforts in creating a supportive and friendly academic environment.
I cannot end without thanking my family, for their immeasurable love and support.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION
Page
1
Research Questions............................................................................ 3
Literature Review 4
Methodology 12
Tenninology 14
Summary 18
II. RUSSIAN MEDIA AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION 20
III. MEDIA OWNERSHIP IN RUSSIA (PRINTED PRESS) 31
IV. HYPOTHESES 41
V. DATA ANALYSIS 49
Sample 49
General Overview........................................................................................ 49
Hypothesis 1: Soviet-era Journalists are More Predisposed Towards
Self-censorship than Post-Soviet Era Journalists 53
Hypothesis 2: Self-censorship is Caused by Editorial Censorship 55
Hypothesis 3: Journalists Who Practice Self-censorship When They Write
Articles for the Newspapers They Work for Publish More Courageous
Articles On-line............................................................................................ 60
Chapter
viii
Page
Hypothesis 4: Media Qwnership Directly Affects
the Level of Self-censorship Among Journalists 62
VI. CONCLUSIONS 64
APPENDICES 69
A. SURVEY: SELF-CENSORSHIP IJ~ RUSSIAN PRWTED PRESS........... 69
B. TABLES OF SURVEY RESULTS............................................................. 75
BIBLIOGRAPHY 86
1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Post-Soviet Russia has often presented a puzzle to Western analysts and their
theories of social transformation. At the time of the Soviet collapse, it was widely held
that incipient elections would lead to the construction of a democratic state and that the
elimination of state ownership and creation of free prices would lead to the development
of capitalism.! These predictions proved at best only partially correct, and substantial
theorizing has attempted to explain what happened instead and why.
An equally puzzling element of the transformation has been the legal abolition of
state censorship in 1991. Newspapers are now in the hands of private owners and legal
censorship has been outlawed, yet it is routine for analysts to describe press freedoms as
under the direct control of the state apparatus in a way that is detrimental to free speech.
In 2009 "Reporters Without Borders" ranked Russia 153rd out of 175 countries in their
"Index on Censorship," after Venezuela, Afghanistan and Iraq.2
This thesis aims to empirically measure censorship and self-censorship among
print journalists in contemporary Russia in an effort to understand the current state of
I Anders Aslund, Building capitalism: the transformation ofthe former Soviet bloc (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Daniel Treisrnan, After the deluge: regional crises and political
consolidation in Russia (Ann Arbor, Mich: University ofMichigan Press, 1999); Adam Przeworski,
Sustainable democracy (Cambridge, [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
2 Reporters Without Borders, "Obarna effect in US, while Europe continues to recede Israel in free fall,
Iran at gates ofinfemal trio," Press Freedom Index 2009, http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-
2009,l001.html (accessed May 2, 2010).
2affairs and how the press might be controlled in the absence of formal state governance.
I also have a personal motivation for choosing this particular topic. For eight years I
worked as ajournalist in Russia, first for the weekly magazine Ogonek, then for Esquire
(Russian edition), a monthly publication. My articles focused primarily on social and
socio-political issues. Although I do not agree with the assumptions of many ofmy
Western colleagues that being a journalist in Russia is exceptionally dangerous, I did feel
certain limitations in the choice of topics that I could cover. The question of what was
allowed and what was not allowed to write about was always there, but the mechanism of
content regulation worked on a much subtler level than is often portrayed by Western
journalists and human rights activists. The claim that freedom of speech does not exist in
Russia undermines the efforts of thousands ofjournalists who criticize the Russian
government on a daily basis. However, it cannot be said that the level of freedom in the
printed press is equal to that in the West, or even that what constitutes as an
understanding of freedom of the press is the same in Russia as it is in the West.
The central research question is: What is the relationship between, on the one
hand, ownership, editorial control and governmental flak, and, on the other, self-
censorship on the part of Russian journalists? Are journalists obeying "the rules of the
game" and acting on informal norms and their interpretation of the political atmosphere,
or do owners and their editorial staff directly limit journalist writings on politics?
3Research questions
While pursuing the goal of measuring and identifying the significance of editorial
and self-censorship in the contemporary Russian printed media, this thesis examines a
number of questions:
1) What is the extent of self-censorship in the contemporary Russian printed
press? That is, how often do journalists from the ten most popular Moscow-based
newspapers report self-censorship?
2). What factors shape the phenomenon of self-censorship among Russian
journalists?
3). Are journalists who started their careers during the Soviet period more likely
to practice self-censorship than later generations?
4). To what extent does censorship originate from the editors of the newspapers
and how significant is the extent of self-censorship that the journalists practice on their
own initiative?
5). Are articles that are deemed too critical of the state published elsewhere, such
as in online publications?
Before answering these questions in Chapter V, I examine the current state of the
media laws in Russia and look back at the history of the printed media starting with the
early nineties, particularly 1991, when censorship in Russia was officially outlawed.
4Literature review
Censorship and freedom of speech in Russia have been widely debated in the
fields ofjournalism, public policy, history, in politics, as well as within the rubric of civil
society? However, previous research - both Russian and Western - have not adequately
explored the problem of self-censorship. The relative brevity of the post-Soviet period,
combined with the Russian media's unstable and rapidly changing state, partly explains
this lack of attention. At the same time, it is common for both Western and Russian
analysts to refer to the Russian media as censored and to compare it to the media ofthe
Soviet period.
Western analysis of the Russian press frequently refers to the Four Theories o/the
Press,4 which classified the world media into four types: "authoritarian," "libertarian,"
"social responsibility" and "Soviet-totalitarian,"s and subsequently turned into a very
popular theory.6 The authors of the book offer a geo-political view of the world's media
3 For the thorough analyses of the contemporary Russian press structure, see Alex Lupis, "Increasing Press
Repression in Russia." Nieman Reports 59, no. 22 (2005); Kaarle Nordenstreng, Elena Vartanova, and
lassen N. Zassurskii, eds. Russian media challenge (Helsinki: Aleksanteri Institute. Kikimora publications,
2001); Birgit Beumers, Stephen C. Hutchings, and Natalia Ryleva, eds. The post-Soviet Russian media:
conflicting signals (London: Routledge, 2009); H. De Smaele, "Limited Access to Information as a Means
of Censorship in Post-Communist Russia." Javnost - The Public 11, no. 2 (2004); David Dadge, Silenced:
International Journalists Expose Media Censorship (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2005); V.R.
Firsov, Tsenzura v Rossii: Istoriia i Sovremennost': sbornik nauchnykh trudov (Sankt-Peterburg:
Rossiiskaia natsionalnaia biblioteka, 2001).
4 Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm, Four Theories ofthe Press: the Authoritarian,
Libertarian, Social Responsibility, and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press Should Be and Do.
5 Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm, Four Theories ofthe Press: the Authoritarian,
Libertarian, Social Responsibility, and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press Should Be and Do, 2.
6 Myung-Jin Park, and James Curran, eds., De-Westernizing media studies (London: Routledge, 2000), 3.
5as divided into three camps: the "free world of the liberal democracy,,7 (America, Great
Britain, European countries), the Soviet-totalitarian sphere (USSR) and the third world,
or "authoritarian societies"S (Fascist Germany, some Latin American countries, etc.)
Although the USSR has ceased to exist, the definitions established by the Four Theories
are still being referred to in journalistic research. However, in recent years several
scholars such as James Curran, Myung-Jin Park,9 John C. Nerone, and others!O have
questioned the validity of such definitions.
It is common for the Western press to publish articles that highlight the atrocities
committed by the Russian government in an effort to control the press. For example, The
New York Times frequently writes about the dangers of working in Russia as ajournalist,
the vindictiveness of Putin's administration!! and the horrors of the Russian censorship,12
7 Myung-Jin Park, and James Curran, eds., De-Westernizing media studies, 4.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.; Myung-Jin Park, and James Curran, eds., De-Westernizing media studies.
10 John C. Nerone, ed., Last rights: revisiting/our theories o/the press. The history 0/communication
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995).
11 Clifford J. Levy, "Putin's Iron Grip on Russia Suffocates Opponents," The New York Times, February 24,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/world/europe/24putin.html (accessed April 29, 2010).
12 David Carr, "A Most Dangerous Profession in Russia," The New York Times Media Decoder Blog,
entry posted on September 15,2009, http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/15/a-most-
dangerous-profession-in-russia/?scp=1&sg=Russia%20press%20censorship&st=cse (accessed April 29,
2010).
6comparing its intensity to the one in Communist China,13 and claims Russia to be "the
third most dangerous country for the press, after Iraq and Algeria.,,14
Not only newspaper articles contribute to the creation of a neo-Soviet image of
the contemporary Russian media. Numerous reports published in specialized journals
also support this idea. Alex Lupis in his article "Increasing Press Repression in Russia"
writes about the "Kremlin's growing authoritarianism" 15 and "press repression,,16 that
provokes the dismissal as well as murder ofjournalists. l ? H. De Smaeli in "Limited
Access to Information as a Means of Censorship in Post-Communist Russia" states that
the contemporary Russian press is "very much like Soviet Press,,18 and cites a report from
Freedom House,19 in which the status of Russian mass media was lowered from "partly
13 David W. Dunlap and James Estrin, "Press control- censorship - is something that happens in
Communist China, in Russia," The New York Times Blog by David W.Dunlap and James Estrin, posted on
September 23, 2009,
http://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/archive-5/?scp=2&sq=Russia%2Opress%20censorship&st=cse
(accessed April 29, 2010); Clifford J. Levy, "Russia's Leaders See China as a Template for Ruling," The
New York Times, October 17, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/1 0/18/worldleurope/ l8russia.html?scp=20&sq=Russia%20freedom%2Oofllo
20speech&st=cse (accessed April 29, 2010).
14 Clifford 1. Levy, "Press Group Seeks Inquiry Into Killings in Russia," The New York Times, September
16,2009.http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/ l6/worldleurope/ l6russia.html?scp=42&sq=censorship%20Rus
sia&st=cse (accessed April 29, 2010).
15 Alex Lupis, "Increasing Press Repression in Russia." Nieman Reports 59, no. 22 (2005): 118.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 118-120.
18 H. De Smaele, "Limited Access to Information as a Means of Censorship in Post-Communist Russia,"
Javnost- The Public 11, no. 2 (2004): 66.
19 Freedom House is an international non-governmental organization based in the United States that
conducts research and advocacy on conceptions of human rights and political freedom. For more
information about Freedom House, see http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=265#3 (accessed May
2,2010).
free" in 2002 to "not free" in 2003.20 Lucas Edwards in his article "The Big Squeeze,,21
writes that Putin's regime "has destroyed, castrated or sidelined all the institutions that
might have been a check on its greed and ruthlessness: the courts, the civil service, civil
society, political parties, the legislature, local government and the institutions of the
outside world.,,22 He continues, "Putin and his ex-KGB friends have systematically
closed down the independent media that matters - national television - and bullied and
browbeaten the rest. ,,23
On the other hand, there are authors who question the conventional Western
approach towards Russian media. Thus, in the books Putin 's Russia: Past Imperfect,
Future Uncertain,24 Vladimir Putin and the New World Order: Looking East, Looking
West?25 and Putin: Russia's Choice,26 the authors, speaking of the press, state that there
are still some Russian outlets that are independent from the government. At the same
time they acknowledge that Russian media remains "semi-muzzled,,,27 with Putin
controlling most of it. They claim that, as opposed to Gorbachev's glasnost', Putin's
20 Ibid.
21 Edward Lucas, "The Big Squeeze," Index on Censorship 37, no 1 (2008): 26-34.
22 Ibid., 26.
23 Ibid., 27.
24 Dale R. Herspring, Putin's Russia: past imperfect, future uncertain (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield,
2003).
25 J. L. Black, Vladimir Putin and the new world order: looking east, looking west? (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield 2004).
26 Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia's choice (London: Routledge, 2004).
27 J. L. Black, Vladimir Putin and the new world order: looking east, looking west?, 346.
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Russia exists in a state of neglasnost'. 28 The authors give only a partial explanation for
how exactly the independent media outlets function within this system.
Some authors, such as Peter Baker and Susan Glasser in Kremlin Rising: Vladimir
Putin's Russia and the End ofRevolution,29 while analyzing contemporary Russian
media, prefer to discuss only Russian television, which is controlled by the Russian
authorities to a greater extent than any other media. They draw their conclusions about
the freedom of the Russian press using data regarding only one media, which happens to
be the most rigorously censored.
Russian publications that reach a wide audience in the West are, as a rule, ones
that are written by oppositional writers and journalists. Although they contain factual
information about today's Russia, they are frequently based on the personal experiences
f h · h P . hk' 30 P l' k k' 31 P 32 T b 33o t e wnters, suc as amus In, 0 It ovs ala ,ozner, regu ova,
Ko1esnikov,34 who are famous journalists with unique backgrounds that differ from those
of the majority of everyday Russian journalists. These sources do not enable us to
28 Ibid., 106.
29 Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, Kremlin rising: Vladimir Putin's Russia and the end ofrevolution (New
York: Scribner, 2005).
30 V. A. Paniushkin, Mikhail Khodorkovskii: Uznik tishiny: Istoriia pro to, kak cheloveku v Rossii stat'
svobodnym i chto emu za eto budet (Moskva: ZAO Izdatelskii dom "Sekret fInny," 2006).
31 Anna Politkovskaia and A. L. Tait, A Russian diary: ajournalist'sjinal account oflife, corruption, and
death in Putin's Russia (New York: Random House, 2007).
32 Vladimir Pozner, Parting with illusions (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990).
33 Elena V. Tregubova, Baiki kremlevskogo diggera (Moskva: Ad Marginem, 2003).
34 Andrei Kolesnikov, "Freedom of expression: for what? It's written in to the Russian constitution but no
one takes it for real," Index on Censorship 32 (2003): 21-22.
9evaluate the overall condition of the Russian press or to understand the significance of
self-censorship among journalists. While mentioning the existence of self-censorship, and
the fears that exist among Russian journalists, they do not attempt to measure this
phenomenon or to explain how it functions on a daily basis. They do not explain how
self-censorship is reflected in the texts of everyday Russian journalists. Various questions
arise: Do all journalists who write about politics receive death threats? Are they unable to
write anything without consulting the higher authorities? Are they all afraid of any
critical comments about the government, or is criticism allowed? I will address these
questions later in my analysis in the survey results.
In recent years, there have been several studies that provide a more complete and
varied picture of the contemporary Russian press. For example, The Post-War Russian
Media: Conflicting Signa[s35 is a collection of essays dedicated to the post-Soviet press,
television, and radio. The fragmentary structure of the book is explained by the fact that
the Russian media itself can be better understood through an interdisciplinary approach;
utilizing sociological, political, literary, and cultural-anthropological methodologies.
Instead of claiming that Russian media is undemocratic, they answer the question: Why
does the Russian media not fit into a Western concept of democracy? One of the
contributing authors, Samuel A. Green, in his essay "Shifting media and the failure of
35 Birgit Beumers, Stephen C. Hutchings, and Natalia Ryleva, eds. The post-Soviet Russian media:
conflicting signals.
10
political communication in Russia,,,36 argues that one of the key puzzles in contemporary
Russia is "the inability of the civil society to mobilize around (...) the massive common
grievances.,,3? He states that the Post-Soviet media, although having enough freedom of
expression, failed to play "the aggregating and galvanizing role described by Hume and
de Toqueville,,,38 and to be capable ofdropping "the same thought into a thousand minds
at the same moment.,,39 Green sees the inability to communicate with the reader, not the
governmental restrictions, as the most important problem of the Russian press.
In De- Westernizing Media StudieiO the authors look at conventional Western
theories of the press and argue that they were initially based on concepts that negated the
significance of national cultures, history and the pluralistic character of the media system.
The authors claim that, although free media exists in Russia, it faces certain limitations,
such as the lack of "accumulated experience of objective or independent journalism,'>'!l
mistrust of the audience, and "underdeveloped professionalism rather than dictatorial
law.,,42
36 Samuel A. Green, "Shifting media and the failure of political communication in Russia," in The post-
Soviet Russian media: conflicting signals, edited by Birgit Beumers, Stephen C. Hutchings, and Natalia
Rulyova (London: Routledge, 2009), 56-70.
37 Ibid., 56.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Park, Myung-Jin, and James Curran. De-Westernizing media studies. London: Routledge.
41 Ibid., 91.
42 Ibid., 91-92.
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Andrei Rikhter, the director and founder of the Moscow Media Law and Policy
Institute, and Professor at the School of Journalism at the Moscow State University, in his
article "Post-Soviet Perspective on Censorship and Freedom of the Media,,43 sums up
various types of "soft censorship" in Russia. In his work he refers to self-censorship as
one of the most important factors in today's media development. Various Russian
journalists, media analysts and human rights activists also discuss self-censorship.
Among them are 01eg Panfi10v, the head ofthe Center for Journalism in Extreme
Situations,44 Andrei Piontkovkii, journalist and po1itician,45 and Sergei Parkhomenko,
journalist and editor.46 These discussions, however, do not provide us with any evidence
of self-censorship or any tool to measure it.
The primary sources referred to in this research can be divided into several
categories.
First of all, I use Russian newspapers as sources of the articles that might be
affected by self-censorship. The choice of the outlets was based on the rating of the
printed press made by Ex Libris in the end of2009 (this rating is discussed in detail in the
methodology section below).
43 Andrei Rikhter, "Post-Soviet Perspective On Censorship and Freedom of the Media," International
Communication Gazette 70, no. 5 (2008): 307-324.
44 Bishkek Press Club, "Otkrytaia Lektsiia Olega Panfilova: Tsenzura i Samotsenzura v Sovremennoi
Zhumalistike," BPC Events, January 6, 2009, http://www.bpc.kg/events/26l (accessed May 2,2010).
45 Andrei Piontkovskii, "Samaya effektivnaia forma tsenzury - samotsenzura," Index. Dosie Na Tsenzury,
20 (2004), http://www.index.org.ru/joumal/20/piontk20.html (accessed May 2,2010).
46 Radio France Intemacionale, "Sergei Parkhomenko: V Rossii est' samotsenzura - ochen' razvitaia,
ochen' izoshchrennaia, ochen' glubokaia: ludi sami znaiut, chego im nelzia," RFI in Russian, August 24,
2008, http://www.rfi.fr/acturu/articles/104/article l12l.asp (accessed May 2, 2010).
12
Secondly, I refer to the laws and regulations on the freedom of the press that were
issued in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia, such as the law "On the Counteraction against
Terrorism," "On the Fight against Terrorism," "On the Application of the Changes into
Particular Legislative Actions of the Russian Federation in the Context of the
Improvement of the Governmental Administration in the Area of the Counteraction
against Terrorism," Russian Criminal Code, Constitution of the Russian Federation
(adopted at National Voting on December 12, 1993), and the Mass Media Law of the
Russian Federation (1991).47
Thirdly, I refer to the data on censorship and freedom of the press provided by
international press organizations such as Reporters Without Borders, World Press
Freedom Committee and Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR).
Finally, I conduct a telephone survey ofa sample of Moscow newspaper
journalists. This survey is focused on questions of regulation within the workplace, as
well as restrictions that the journalists impose upon themselves while reporting and
writing.
Methodology
The frequency of self-censorship and hypotheses about its causes are examined
using a random sample of Moscow-based journalists interviewed by telephone. It is
possible that my experience working as a journalist for eight years in Kazan and in
47 Russian Federation, Law of the Russian Federation: «On the Mass Media», No 2124-1, December 27,
1991, Chapter 3, http://www.medialaw.ru/e pages/laws/russian/massmedia eng/massmedia eng.html
(accessed May 2, 2010).
13
Moscow was an asset to me during the survey process; the respondents were perhaps
more receptive to answering potentially sensitive questions regarding censorship when
being questioned by a colleague, rather than by someone who is not personally familiar
with the unique characteristics ofjournalism in Russia.
The selection of the newspapers for the survey was based upon the rating of the
Russian socio-political daily and weekly newspapers for the fourth quarter of2009
created by the Russian agency of media research Ex Libris.48
Ex Libris is a member of the International Association for Measurement and
Evaluation of Communication (AMEC). They provide a popularity rating that is
independent from expert opinions or organizations and is based upon publicly available
data. The rating covers five different categories of publications: business newspapers,
socio-politica1 newspapers, socio-po1itica1 magazines, business magazines and popular
"yellow" newspapers (tabloids). In this research I focus exclusively on socio-po1itica1
newspapers, considering that that the outlets in this group are the ones most likely to
publish articles that are related to Russian politics on a daily and weekly basis. Therefore,
the journalists who are working in those outlets; specifically in the political and social
news' departments, are the ones most likely to be experiencing self-censorship.
The rating is based on the following data: 1). The size of the audience (the rating
of the popularity among readers); 2). The price of the advertisement (the rating of the
popularity among advertisers); 3). The frequency of quotation level in other publications
48 Ex Libris, "Title Popularity Rating - IV Kvartal2009," Ex Libris TPR,
http://www.exlibris.ru/ru/stats/tpr.htrnl?date=10010l.htrnl (accessed May 2, 2010).
14
or media outlets (the rating of the popularity among external journalists); 4).The
frequency of quotation in the publications in social media, such as blogs, internet-
sources, etc. (the rating of the popularity and significance in the socially active circles of
society). The size of the audience is defined by the average issue readership (AIR), the
data is based on the information provided by TNS Gallup and Comcon.49
Terminology
In this work I refer to the definition of self-censorship given by Arlen Blium as
"self-limitation in the process of the creation of the text, when the author bases his
decisions on certain taboos that are imposed by the government, society, the peculiarities
of the readership or his personal aesthetic tastes or moral principles."so I narrow my
empirical focus to self-censorship aimed at avoiding government criticism. Therefore,
while discussing aspects of self-censorship, I refer to "political self-censorship," not
taking into account any other types of censorship, such as attempts by businessmen to
limit the release of potentially detrimental information, or the censoring of publications in
order to avoid inciting ethic tension or conflict.
I use the term "editorial censorship" to define the limitations imposed upon the
journalist by the editor of the department or the editor of the magazine, when the editor
49 Ibid.
50 Arlen V. Blium, Sovetskaia tsenzura v epokhu total'nogo ferrora, 1929-1953 (S.-Peterburg:
Akademicheskii proekt, 2000): 14.
15
either eliminates phrases or words that are critical of the government, or prevents the
entire article from being published because of its critical content.
It is quite common for authors who write about censorship in Soviet Russia to
refer to the problem of self-censorship.sl Indeed, while Glavlit and other departmentsS2
were created for imposing official state censorship upon Soviet writers and journalists,
this was not the only form of censorship that existed at the time. Self-censorship played a
big role in Soviet journalism and literature. As Dewhirst puts it, there did not necessarily
need to be "an official censorship body for regular and rigorous censorship to exist."s3
Anatolii Kuznetsov, a prominent Soviet and Russian writer, described the self-
censorship that existed in the Soviet period as "an inner censor," without which writing
"required a tremendous effort."s4 He stated that "Everything, without exception, that was
51 For more information about self-censorship in Soviet Russia, see A.V. Blium, Sovetskaia tsenzura v
epokhu total'nogo terrora, 1929-1953; Martin Dewhirst and Robert Farrell, The Soviet censorship
(Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1973); G. V. Zhirkov, Istoriia tsenzury v Rossii XIX-XX vv.: uchebnoe
posobie dlia studentov vysshikh uchebnykh zavedenii (Moskva: Aspekt Press, 2001).
52 Censorship in Soviet Russia was legally enforced by Glavlit, or the Main Administration for
Safeguarding State Secrets, formed in 1922. This organ was in charge of safeguarding state secrets. Besides
Glavlit, Goskomizdat censored the publication of the books; Goskino was in charge of the cinema;
Gosteleradio of radio and television broadcasting. Many institutions had the First Departments which were
responsible for controlling the informational flow. Censorship of the media was also guaranteed by the fact
that the state owned all publishing houses, TV stations and other production facilities, so all the journalists
were employees of the state. For more information about Soviet censorship, see Goriaeva, Politicheskaia
tsenzura v SSSR: 1917-1991, 146-147; N.Korenev, "Oratoriia Laboratorii 17-a," Liki Rossii [2004].
http://www.1iki-rossii.ru/LETI/17NChlSecret%282%29.htm (accessed April 24, 2010); P. Steiner
"Introduction: On Samizdat, Tamizdat, Magnitizdat, and Other Strange Words That Are Difficult to
Pronounce". Poetics Today 29, no. 4 (2008): 614.
53 Martin Dewhirst, "Censorship in Russia, 1991 and 2001," Journal ofCommunist Studies & Transition
Politics 18, no. 1 (2002): 22.
54 Martin Dewhirst and Robert Farrell, The Soviet censorship, 26.
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published in the Soviet Union bears the stigma of two censors: first the internal self-
censor and then the external official censor.,,55
When official censorship ceased to exist, it might be expected that self-censorship
would disappear as well. Yet within Russia self-censorship continued and became one of
the major problems in post-Soviet journalism. Moscow-based journalist and publisher,
Sergei Parkhomenko, in an interview with Radio France claimed that the "Russian
people... know themselves, what they are allowed and what they are not allowed to do.,,56
Parkhomenko states:
...The problem ofRussian society today, in particular for those who are rich,
educated, advanced, and to a certain degree intelligent and creative, is that the
people are scared. They are not scared to be punished, they are just scared, so to
say, for themselves... For instance, I am sure that there is no censorship in Russia.
There is self-censorship in Russia - very well-developed, very sophisticated, very
deep: people know themselves, what is not allowed. They remember that
themselves. They... can say to their colleague, 'Hey, what are you writing? This is
not allowed! You'll be punished!' And he believes that. You can ask various
bosses, why so- and so- is not allowed to be on the TV, why this and that topics
are not being discussed, why this and that text is not being published. And these
bosses will honestly reply, 'And why is it my fault? I have not given any
commands, I have not asked, I have not banned anything.' They do it themselves.
People understand on their own, what is "good" and what is "bad.,,57
A famous journalist and human rights activist Oleg Panfilov, during his press conference
in Bishkek Press club also discussed the problem of self-censorship in today's press in
55 Ibid., 27.
56 Radio France Intemacionale, "Sergei Parkhomenko: V Rossii est' samotsenzura - ochen' razvitaia,
ochen' izoshchrennaia, ochen' glubokaia: liudi sarni znaiut, chego im nel'zia," RFI in Russian, August 24,
2008, http://www.rfi.fr/acturu/articles/104/article 112l.asp (accessed May 2,2010).
57 Ibid.
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the post-Soviet space. In emphasizing the importance of creating a civil society in which
the freedom of the speech without self-censorship is the norm, he stated that "the quality
ofjournalism and the questions of censorship depend not as much on the journalists, but
on the society," 58 and that it is important to create. Russian political journalist Andrei
Piontokovskii in his interview for the magazine Indeks in 2004 stated that "we cannot
speak about a wonderful independent press that was suppressed by Putin and FSB. It has
been a much more complicated process.,,59 He argued that "we are all educated people...
and we all understand what will lead to our own economic success and what wi11lead to
the opposite results... today, with a formal ban on censorship, flourishes the most
effective form of censorship - self-censorship.,,60
As we can see, there are many discussions about the nature of self-censorship in
Russia, especially in the circles of the intellectuals and media workers, but there have
been no attempts to measure to what degree it is present in the Russian press. Another
thing that is not quite clear is to what extent the journalists censor themselves, and what
role the editor plays in this process. Journalists and media analysts, discussing censorship
and self-censorship, frequently use these terms as interchangeable. However, these terms
are quite different: while "censorship" requires the existence of a censor and a specialized
censoring apparatus, "self-censorship" does not. I use the terms "self-censorship" and
58 Institute for War and Peace Reporting. «The biggest problem of the Kyrgyz journalism is its
politicization," November 5, 2009, http://www.iwpr.net/ru/report-news/<<caMaSl-6oJIbIlIaSl-6eJla-
KbIprbI3CTaHCKOH-:>KYPHaJIllCTllKll--B-ee-rrOJIHTH3HpoBaHHocTll»-0
59 Andrei Piontkovskii, "Samaia effektivnaia forma tsenzury - samotsenzura," Index. Dos 'e Na Tsenzuru,
20 (2004), http://www.index.org.ru/journal/20/piontk20.html (accessed May 2,2010).
60 Ibid.
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"editorial censorship" to distinguish between the two different types of non-governmental
(not imposed directly by the government or governmental institutions) censorship. For
the sake ofconvenience I use the verb "to censor" while referring to the general act of
eliminating any text critical of the government from the article, either by the editor or by
the journalist.
Summary
By interviewing contemporary Russian journalists and analyzing their answers
and comments to the questions posed to them regarding a general overview of the
Russian press, this thesis seeks to answer the question: To what extent does self-
censorship exist in the Russian printed media? To achieve the goal of answering this
research question, the following chapters examine various aspects of censorship and self-
censorship in Russian press, provide a general analysis of the media in Russia, and
analyze extensive survey data.
Chapter II - Russian media after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This chapter
examines the evolution of the Russian press since 1991, the year when the Soviet Union
collapsed and censorship was proclaimed illegal. I look at a number of events, such as the
War in Chechnya and terrorist acts in Russia, and analyze how they affected freedom of
press in Russia, legally and officially (introduction of new laws restricting freedom of
speech) as well as unofficially. This chapter helps us to understand how official
governmental decisions about press regulations, even those that were never implemented,
affected the general mood of society and journalists, and thus creating self-censorship.
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Chapter III - Media ownership in Russia. Media ownership in Russia has gone
through several stages in the past 50 years. First it was owned by the government of the
Soviet Union, then belonged to a handful of the oligarchs during the 90s, and finally it
was consolidated under governmental ownership once again after Vladimir Putin became
president of Russia in 2000. In this chapter I give an overview of the ownership of
Russian media, and provide an analysis of the ownership of the ten most popular Russian
newspapers (according to data collected and analyzed by the media agency Ex Libris in
the last quarter of 2009).
Chapter IV - Hypotheses. In this chapter I propose five hypotheses about self-
censorship in the contemporary Russian printed press, which will subsequently be tested
in the survey.
Chapter V - Data Analysis. This chapter examines the interrelationship ofthe
different types of censorship and what social conditions (such as the type of newspaper,
particular generation ofjournalist, or ownership structure) make self-censorship more
likely. The survey results reflect journalists' views of state control, repression and
freedom within their profession.
Chapter VI - Conclusions. This chapter draws together the various findings and
theories developed in the preceding chapters which, taken as a whole, answer the primary
research question. In the conclusion I also identify other pertinent research questions
about censorship in Russia, and what direction future investigation might take.
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CHAPTER II
RUSSIAN MEDIA AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION
According to the Media Law of the Russian Federation (1991),61 and the
constitution of the Russian Federation (adopted at Vsenarodnoe Golosovanie [National
Voting] on December 12, 1993), censorship in Russia is illega162.
A series of events significantly affected press freedom after 1991: war in
Chechnya, and a series of domestic terrorist attacks. As a consequence of these events,
the Russian government issued a number of laws and regulations restricting press
freedom. These regulations, as we will see, were not followed uniformly throughout
Russia and, in fact, were applied selectively. Therefore, the effect of these regulations
upon legal restrictions of press freedoms was not altogether significant. The significance
of these regulations can be found in the affect they had on the general level of self-
censorship among Russian journalists, contributing to the creation of unofficial lists of
"banned" topics. Understanding the nature of these official restrictions will help us see
what factors might have been essential in the process of the journalistic self-regulation,
61 Russian Federation, Law of the Russian Federation: «On the Mass Media», No 2124-1, December 27,
1991, Chapter 3, http://www.medialaw.ru/e pages/laws/russian/massmedia eng/massmedia eng.html
(accessed May 2,2010).
62 Russian Federation, Constitution of the Russian Federation, December, 12, 1993, Chapter 2, article 29,
http://www.constitution.ru (accessed May 2, 2010).
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and justify the selection of the topics that are considered to be an absolute taboo among
the journalists (we will discuss this in detail in Chapter V).
The First War in Chechnya started in 1994 and ended in 1996. As a result, the
Russian army was defeated, and Chechnya gained independence and the self-appointed
status of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriia. 63 Russia sought to avenge itself for its defeat
in the first Chechen engagement and renewed hostilities in 1999. This Second Chechen
War officially ended ten years later, in April 200964. The terrorist attacks in Russia,
which Russian officials attributed to the Chechen separatists, started in the late 90s and
went through the 2000s. Therefore, the second Chechen war was officially named
"operation to suppress terrorism.,,65 It created the popular assumption that everyone who
was fighting on the Chechen side was a terrorist.66
The most tragic terrorist acts were widely covered in the press. They are: the
explosion in the underground passageway near Pushkin square in 2000 (13 people died);
siege on Dubrovka theatre (known as Nord-Ost by the name of the musical that was
performed at the time), when nearly 175 people died, and the school siege in Beslan,
63 GlobalSecurity.org, "First Chechnya War 1994-1996,"
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/chechnyal.htm (accessed May 2, 2010).
64 Aleksandr Ivanov, "The Counter-Terrorist Operation Regime Belongs to History," RIA-Novosti, April
16,2009, http://rian.ru/defense safety/20090416/168286167.html (accessed May 2,2010).
65 Emil Pain, and Robert R. Love, "Regional Studies - The Second Chechen War: The Information
Component," Military Review 80, no 4 (2000): 59.
66 Interestingly, a very similar ideology was held in the U.S., when the war in Iraq was called "operation
Iraqi freedom" and the war captives were given the status of the "unlawful combatants" and therefore were
not considered to be defended by the Geneve convention on the war prisoners. For more information, see
Knut Dormann, "The Legal Situation of "Unlawful- Unprivileged Combatants," International Review of
the Red Cross 849 (2003): 45-47.
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Northern Ossetia (when approximately 350 people, a significant number of children
among them, were killed).
Changes in public attitude towards Chechnya occurred throughout both wars.
When the first war in Chechnya began in the early 90' s, Russia was still in a state of a
relative chaos after the rapid change of the governmental regime from Soviet
totalitarianism to nascent democracy.67 Therefore, there were no strict rules regarding the
covering of the war by the press, and journalists had wide access to the battlefields and
war zones.
68 Subsequently, at the end of the first war the government literally accused the
press of engendering defeat. When the second war began, the administration significantly
limited access to information about the war.69
Public opinion underwent many changes from the early 90's to the late 2000's.
Polls show that in the beginning of the first war most Russian citizens were against the
war in Chechnya and were in favor ofChechen independence. In September 1994 (1602
people polled), when war was yet to be declared but the possibility of the commencement
of hostilities was clear, 42% of respondents agreed that "Russia should stay away from
the conflict in Chechnya."7o In December of the same year, 36% of the respondents (1600
people polled) to the question "What actions should Russia conduct towards Chechnya?"
67 Kerstin Olofsson, "The Cultural Debate on Abolishing Censorship," Russian Reports (2000): 31.
68 Andrei Soldatov, Irina Borogan, Marina Latysheva and Anna Stavitskaia, "The Year of 1999: The
Beginning of the Second Chechen War," Journalists and Terrorism (2008): 18.
69 Ibid., 8-19.
70 Dukhovnoe Nasledie, "The Reflexions of the First and the Second Chechen Campaigns in the Minds of
Our Compatriots," Nasledie.ru, http://www.nasledie.ru/politvnt/19 38/article.php?art=62 (accessed May 2,
2010).
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replied that there should be a search for a "peaceful resolution to the problem," 23% of
the respondents were in favor ofa "withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya." In
January 1995, 62% of the respondents (1547 people polled) expressed doubts about the
capability of Russian troops to establish peace and order in Chechnya; 42% of the
respondents blamed the failure ofRussian troops in Chechnya on an unskilled command
and operation planning, 77% of the respondents did not support the bombing attack of the
capital ofChechnya, Groznyi.71 The poll that was held in March of the same year showed
that 44% of respondents (2000 people polled) did not know the reason for the war in
Chechnya, while 22% believed that the reason was "to conceal illegal business."n But in
1999 and later the attitude of Russian citizens towards the war was quite different. This
can partially be explained by the terrorist acts that were taking place all across Russia and
were attributed directly to Chechen separatists. The general perception of Chechens and
Chechnya became very negative. More than 60% of those polled agreed that they felt the
need for revenge and hatred towards Chechen separatists, many stated that "Chechens get
what they deserve.,,73 The public widely supported Putin's policies and military actions in
Chechnya. In November 1999, 61 % of those polled agreed with the continuation of
military intervention in Chechnya, 55% disagreed with the plan of cessation of hostilities
proposed by Grigorii Yavlinskii.74
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
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By the end of2002, 46% ofRussian citizens who were asked the question "How
do you think the conflict in Chechnya should be resolved?" answered "By continuation of
the war.,,75
One possible reason for the deteriorating of the image of Chechnya and Chechens
was the tightening of control over the television in its coverage of the war. The late 90s
and early 2000s were marked by an increase of governmental control of the press. The
owner of the TV-channel NTV, created in 1993 and considered to be the most
independent socio-political channel,76 was forced to give stocks of the company to the
government-owned Gazprom.77 The director of the company was fired and most of the
staff left. It was widely considered to be an act of censorship, where President Putin
played a direct role. Before the takeover he had repeatedly expressed his disagreement
with the policy of the channel.78 The events surrounding NTV are considered to be a
symbolic landmark that defined the new course of the government. The main
75 Mariia Tsvetkova, "Russians Want War in Chechnya Again," Gazeta.ru, October 30,2002,
htto://www.gazeta.ruJ2002/l0/30/rossianesnov.shtml (accessed May 2,2010).
76 Gene Mater, "Once-independent Russian TV-channel in turmoil again," freedomforum.org (October 15,
2001), http://www.mediastudies.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=15149 (accessed May 2,2010).
77 Gazprom is the largest extractor of natural gas in the world and the largest Russian company; after the
collapse of the Soviet Union the company was privatized, but the government still holds a controlling stake.
For mor information about Gazprom, see its official site, www.gazprom.com (accessed May 2, 2010). For
information about the changes in NTV ownership, see CNN, "NTV: Timeline of Events," CNN.com, April
10,2001, http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/04/09/ntv.time1ine/index.htrnl (accessed May 2,
2010).
78 Yevgeniia A1'bats, "Cry for Russia's Lost Press Liberty," The Guardian, May 11,2001,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/200l/may/11/russia.comment (accessed May 2, 2010).
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characteristic of this course is an increase of governmental control over television.79 A
number of TV-companies (TNT, TV6, TVS) became government-owned and changed
their tone from oppositional to pro-governmental. 80 Therefore, the gap between the
television and the printed media increased. While the TV was rapidly becoming more and
more loyal to the government, printed press retained its right to criticize the state or
remain neutral.
There were a number of cases when print journalists were fired after publishing
information on the Chechen conflict. Raf Shakirov, the editor in chief of the newspaper
Izvestia, was dismissed when the newspaper put a big photograph of the victims of
Beslan soon after the Beslan siege in 2004. 81 A popular and successful news anchor and
editor of the program Namedni (NTV), Leonid Parfenov, wanted to show in his program
an interview with the widow of Yandarbiev, the former president of the self-appointed
republic of Ichkeriia, supposedly killed in Qatar by employees of the Russian embassy.
Parfenov was not allowed to show this interview, and afterwards gave a detailed
interview about it to Kommersant newspaper. 82 Subsequently, he was fired. Although
state regulations affected a relatively limited number ofjournalists, the importance of
79 Alex Lupis, "Russia Briefing: Domino Effect," Committee to Protect Journalists, April 2004,
http://cpj.org/reports/200l/04/russia-apr01.php (accessed May 2,2010).
80 Viktor Shenderovich "Zdes' bylo NTV, TV6, TVS. Obstoiatelstva Nepreodolimoi Sily, " Tvoi Golos, June-
November 2003, http://tvoygolos.narod.ru/klio/text1.htm (accessed May 2,2010).
81 BBC, "Viewpoint: Soviet Grip in Russia," BBC News - Europe, November 26,2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4043389.stm (accessed May 2,2010).
82 Maria-Luisa Tirmaste, "Pros'ba byla iz razriada tekh, v kotorykh nel'za otkazat' ," Kommersant, May 31,
2004, http://www.Kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=478840 (accessed May 2,2010).
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these events is not to be underestimated. Both Shakirov and Parfenov are very famous
personas in journalistic circles, so their dismissal was widely discussed by journalists,
who, as a consequence, drew conclusions about "what is allowed" and "what is not
allowed," which could have led to the further increase in self-censorship.
In 2004, the newspaper Nezavisimaia Gazeta published an article about the list of
words that were supposedly banned by the government on the governmental TV-channel
Rossiia (Russia). Among these words was "Chechnya." Stories were to refer to the
"Republic of Chechnya" instead (which stresses that Chechnya is not a separate unit but a
part of Russia). It was also prescribed to say ''poias shakhida" (shakhid's belt) instead of
just shakhid. 83 Interestingly enough, in April 2010, not long after the terrorist attack in
the Moscow metro, Sovet Federatsii (Federation Council) proposed to legally ban the use
of the words "shakhid" and the "Jamaat" in the media in relation to terrorist activity.84
The main "antiterrorist" law in Russia is the Federal Law of the Russian
Federation N35-FZ issued on March 6, 2006, "On Counteraction against Terrorism." It
replaced the law "On the Fight against Terrorism" of December 17, 2004, which, in its
tum, replaced a number of previous laws. 85
83 Sergei Varshavchik, "Na televidenii zachishchaiut terrninologiiu," Nezavisimaia Gazeta, August 2, 2004,
http://www.ng.ruIpolitics/2004-08-02/2 tv.html (accessed May 2,2010).
84 Newsru.com, "Sovet Federacii hochet zapretit' SMI ispolzovat' slova «shakhid» i <<jamaat» po
otnosheniiu k terroristam," April 24, 2010, http://www.newsru.com/russia/24apr201O/sf.html (accessed
May 2,2010).
85Andrei Soldatov, Irina Borogan, Marina Latysheva and Anna Stavitskaia, "The Comparative Analysis of
the Legislatures," Journalists and Terrorism (2008): 195.
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The Center of Journalism in Extreme Situations and human rights activists such as
Marina Litvinovich and Lev Ponomarev expressed their suspicions about the way the
laws would be used. Their concerns were mainly about the possible abuse of this power
and as a consequence an abridgement of the rights of regular citizens who have nothing
to do with terrorists86. The law "On the Counteraction against Terrorism" widened the
definition of the word "terrorism": "Terrorism shall mean the ideology of violence and
the practice of influencing the adoption of a decision by public authorities, local self-
government bodies or international organizations connected with frightening the
population and (or) other forms of unlawful violent actions." 87 Another part of the law
that is hostile to the media is the definition of "terrorist activity" in Article 3. It supposes
to consider terrorist activity as "informational or other assistance to planning, preparing,
or implementing an act of terrorism." The definition is expanded to include
"popularization of terrorist ideas, dissemination of materials or information urging
terrorist activities, substantiating or justifying the necessity of the exercise of such
activity.,,88 Considering the fact that the second war in Chechnya was officially defined
as an "anti-terrorism operation," any critique of this "operation" can be seen as justifying
the necessity of terrorist activity. Even journalists who inform the population about
terrorism acts in detail, including some critical analysis of governmental actions (such as
86 Ibid.
87 Russian Federation, "On the Counteraction Against Terrorism," Federal Law No. 35 FZ, March 6,2006,
Russian Embassy in Canada (unofficial translation), http://www.rusembcanada.rnid.ruIterror e 03.htrnl
(accessed May 2,2010).
88 Ibid.
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criticism of the use of poisonous gas during the Dubrovka siege in 2002, when many
hostages died because of the effect of the gas and not by the hands ofterrorists) might be
seen, according to this law, as the "popularization of terrorist ideas.,,89
In July 6, 2007 a new law "On the Application ofthe Changes into Particular
Legislative Actions of the Russian Federation in the Context of the Improvement of the
Governmental Administration in the Area ofthe Counteraction against Terrorism" was
passed.90 This law made the punishment for extremist actions more severe and
significantly widened the term "extremism.,,91 Furthermore, the national security, defense
and law enforcement agencies sanctioned the creation of the so-called Bastion
qualification course, which is supposed to teachjoumalists the rules of behavior in a war
zone, in the areas of mass rallies, terrorist acts, etc. Even though the course is not
obligatory, it has been widely discussed by Russian media that in the future journalists
who have not passed the Bastion course may not be allowed to cover events in those
areas. 92
Another governmental step that presented a potential threat to freedom of speech
was the special subdivision on the fight against the ideology of terrorism, created by the
National Anti-Terrorist Committee. This group is in charge of the control of zones
89 Ibid.
90 Andrei Soldatov, Irina Borogan, Marina Latysheva and Anna Stavitskaia, "2007: The Law on Terrorism
is Getting More Severe, the "Bastion" Course is Introduced, the FSB Forms the Department on the Fight
with the Terrorist Ideology, the Innovation - Fight against the Websites," Journalists and Terrorism
(2008): 171.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 178.
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"potentially dangerous in tenns of the spread of terrorist ideology" and of the "anti-
propagandistic actions against the ideology of terrorism. ,,93
All these laws notwithstanding, legal regulations rarely serve in Russia as the
basis for media censorship. Russian ombudsman94 Vladimir Lukin reported in 2006, that
"the constitutional right for speech freedom is basically observed, and there is no
institutionalized censorship.,,95 Mikhail Fedorov, the head of the Russian Union of
Journalists, explains that by the "lack ofpolitical will.,,96 He states that the laws are very
restrictive, and once applied, could lead to closing up all the free media in the country.
However, the Russian government is "probably still indecisive,,97 regarding the extent
which it wants to impose restrictions upon the press. Fedorov explains that there is still
no "Federal will" 98 to oppress the media by implementation of the terrorist laws.
Therefore, the significance of the laws analyzed in this chapter lies in their possible
contribution to the process of self-censorship, as well as a general "cooling" affect on
journalists. After the laws were passed, various analysts commented about their possible
93 Ibid., 180.
94 Russian ombudsman position is called Commissioner for Human Rights and is appointed for a certain
term by the Parliament; he cannot be dismissed before the end of his term, and is not subordinate to any
body of power, including the President or the Government. For more information, see
http://ombudsmanrf.ruI(in Russian).
95 Russian Federation, Russian Ombudsman, Sergei Lukin. Doklad Upolnomochennogo po pravam
cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2008, http://old.ombudsmanrf.ruIdoc/ezdoc/08.shtml (accessed May 2,
2010).
96 Lubov' Sharii, «Zakon ob ekstremistakh v deistvii: mneniia ekspertov,» August 26,2006, Grani.ru,
http://www.grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.110506.html (accessed May 2, 2010).
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
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effects. Vladimir Pozner claimed that "the laws are not precise enough,,99 and can affect
multiple targets, causing fear among journalists and triggering an undesirable degree of
self-censorship among them. Ilim Karypbekov argued that these actions could be "a
threat to the development of steady self-censorship among journalists and the mass-
media, becoming a real tool to influence the latter."IOO Furthennore, Russian authorities
have recently appealed to journalists asking directly for an increase in self-censorship.
RamiI' Latypov, the director of the Center of Analysis of the Terroristic threats,
contended that Russian journalists who are covering terrorism should "increase their self-
censorship," and "remember that their publications can be read by children and pregnant
women."IOI The leading expert of the Center, Alexandr Rudakov, suggested that the
journalists in contemporary Russia cannot control what they are writing, unlike in Soviet
times when they could effectively control the flow ofthe released infonnation, which,
according to Rudakov, was a useful skill.
99 "U kazhdogo svoi uroven' ogranicheniia," Viast', November 11,2001, http://www.kommersant.ruJdoc-
rss.aspx?DocsID=350 119 (accessed May 2, 2010).
100 Him Karypbekov, "Terrorism i extremism w SMI kak faktor ugrozy svobody slova w Kirgizstane,"
Journalist News, June 10,2008, http://www.joumalist.kg/?pid=I73&nid=250 (accessed May 2,2010).
101 Sofiia Krapotkina,"Sam sebe Krernl'," Kasparov.ru, April 21, 2010,
http://www.kasparov.ruJmaterial.php?id=4BCEFC90A38A7 (accessed May 2, 2010).
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CHAPTER III
MEDIA OWNERSHIP IN RUSSIA (PRINTED PRESS)
This chapter assesses the importance of the ownership of newspapers for
censorship and self-censorship.
Among the sources for identifying media ownership are the BBC Monitoring
report on the Russian printed press,102 the Harvard University Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs research (created as part of the "Strengthening Democratic
Institutions Project,,103), and the Open Source Center's "Media Aid: Source Description
ofKey Russian Media.,,104 I also use the information that the newspapers provide on their
official web pages when available, as well as anonymous sources cited in other
newspapers' publications that cover the changes is media ownership.
Media experts studying the dynamics of media ownership in post-Soviet Russia
often divide the 1990s and 2000-present as two distinct periods. The 1990s are
characterized by oligarchic ownership of media outlets. The second period is marked by
Putin coming to power and gradually consolidating media ownership; taking it from the
102 BBC, "The Press in Russia," BBC Monitoring, May 16,2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4315129.stm (accessed May 2,2010).
103 Belfer Center For Science and International Affairs, "Russian Media Ownership and Influence Event
Report," BCSIA,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/12757/russian media ownership and influence.htm1?bread
crumb=%2Fpublication%2Fby type%2Fevent report%3Fpage%3D5 (accessed May 2, 2010).
104 Open Source Center, "Russia - Source Descriptors of Key Russian Media," Open Source Center Media
Aid, December 6,2007, www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/russian-media.pdf(accessedMay 2,2010).
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oppositional oligarchs and obliging the pro-governmental corporations to buy them. lOS
John Dunn compares the oligarchic ownership of the media in Russia in the 90s to
the Italian system of lottizzazione, or "division of the spoils,,,106 where there is not
absolute, but limited freedom of the press, which is determined by various media outlets'
owners who compete for political power. At the same time, as Dunn argues, no such
competition between owners occurred in Putin's era.
According to Monroe Price and Peter Krug, Russian media ownership has
"blurred lines.,,107 That is, although some media outlets are privately owned, many
owners are loyal to the administration, or have business interests that are somehow
connected with the government. Let us consider the ownership structure of the ten most
popular Russian newspapers (as the business agency Ex Libris ranked them in the end of
2009).
Kommersant
Kommersant is considered to be "one of Russia's leading business
broadsheets.,,108 It is a daily newspaper that describes itself as "one of the most
105 Birgit Beumers, Stephen C. Hutchings, and Natalia Ryleva, eds. The post-Soviet Russian media:
conflicting signals; Momoe Price and Peter Krug, Ownership in Russia. Scholarly Commons (1996),
http://repository.upenn.edulasc papers/66/ (accessed May 2,2010).
106 John A. Dunn, "Where Did It All Go Wrong," in The post-Soviet Russian media: conflicting signals,
edited by Birgit Beumers, Stephen C. Hutchings, and Natalia Ryleva (London: Routledge, 2009), 42-55.
107 Momoe Price and Peter Krug, Ownership in Russia. Scholarly Commons (1996): 171,
http://repository.upenn.edulasc papers/66/ (accessed May 2,2010).
108 BBC, "The Press in Russia," BBC Monitoring, May 16, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4315129.stm (accessed May 2,2010).
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authoritative and influential publications for Russia's decision-makers,,109 and reports that
more than half of its readers are managers or "specialists." lID Officially the newspaper
Kommersant belongs to ZAoI II "Publishing House Kommersant." Previously, it was
owned by an oligarch Boris Berezovskii (he is now in exile). In August 2006 it was
bought by Alisher Usmanov, 112 a "steel tycoon who also runs a subsidiary of Gazprom
and whose other interests include a major stake in the English football club Arsena1.,,113
Usmanov is considered to be "pro-Kremlin and Gazprom-linked.,,114 When he became
the owner of the ZAG publishing house, the editor in chief ofKommersant, Vladislav
Borodulin, resigned his position. Andrei Vasil'ev, who ran the newspaper from 1999 to
2005, replaced Borodulin as Kommersant's editor, and subsequently made a statement
that the newspaper will remain critical of the government, publishing articles that "might
not please the owner." I 15
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
III In Russian "ZAO" stands for "Zakrytoe Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo," or "closed joined stock company."
112 Marina Rozhkova, Ekaterina Dolgosheeva, and Irina Reznik, "Kommersant Usrnanov: Biznesmen kupil
izdatelskii dom u Badri Patarkatsishvili," Vedomosti, August 31,2006,
http://www.Vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtrnl?2006/08/31/111885 (accessed May 2, 2010); RBK,
"Glava holdinga «Metalloinvest» Alisher Usrnanov priobrel <<J(ommersano>," RBK Daily, August, 30,
2006, http://top.rbc.ru/econornics/30/08/2006/86806.shtml (accessed May 2,2010).
113 Ibid.
114 Open Source Center, "Russia - Source Descriptors ofKey Russian Media," Open Source Center Media
Aid, December 6,2007, www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/russian-media.pdf(accessedMay 2,2010).
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Argumenty i Fakty (Ai£)
AiF was founded in 1978 and "quickly gathered a strong following, with a
reported circulation of more than 33 million in 1990.,,116 Its readership is smaller now
than it used to be, but AiF still remains among the most read general interest newspapers,
whose content is often characterized as a combination of "political analysis and
speculation, patriotic sentiment, high-profile interviews, regional supplements and
consumer advice."II? AiFbelongs to ZAG Argumenty i Fakty, and Promsviaz 'bank, one
of the biggest banks in Russia. I18 It describes its readers as "working people,
businessmen, intellectuals, politicians and managers" 119 and is known for "often taking a
nationalist line.',120 AiF's official webpage presents the newspaper as the one that is "read
by the President Medvedev himself," and a photograph of Medvedev reading AiF with an
1 . d c. • h' 121apparent y mtereste lace accompames t IS statement.
Vedomosti
Vedomosti is a daily business newspaper published in conjunction with the Wall
116 BBC, "The Press in Russia," BBC Monitoring, May 16,2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4315129.stm(accessedMay 2,2010).
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.; Open Source Center, "Russia - Source Descriptors ofKey Russian Media," Open Source Center
Media Aid, December 6, 2007, www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/russian-media.pdf(accessed May 2, 2010).
119 BBC, "The Press in Russia," BBC Monitoring, May 16,2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4315129.stm(accessedMay 2,2010).
120 Open Source Center, "Russia - Source Descriptors ofKey Russian Media," Open Source Center Media
Aid, December 6, 2007, www.fas.org/im/dni/osc/russian-media.pdf(accessed May 2,2010).
121 Argumenty i Fakty, "Nasha Istoriia," ID AiF, http://com.AiF.ru/page/4 (accessed May 2, 2010).
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Street Journal and the Financial Times. It belongs to ZAG Business News Magazine
whish is owned by the Independent Media Sanoma Magazines publishing house, which is
the property of Finland's Sanoma media group. Therefore, Vedomosti is not directly
owned by any Russian corporation.
Vedomosti states its purpose as "to inform readers on a daily basis about the most
important economic, political, financial and corporate events, offering in-depth analysis
and forecasts." 122
Komsomol 'skaia Pravda
This newspaper is a daily tabloid that received its name during Soviet times, when
it was a leading Soviet paper (its title can be translated as The Komsomol Truth). In 1999
"it reached the height of its popularity,,,123 when its daily circulation reached almost 22
million. It is considered to be a newspaper that combines a "firm backing for Kremlin
policy,,124 and "keen interest in celebrity news and scandal from home and abroad.,,125
The newspaper belongs to ZAG Publishing House Komsomol'skaia Pravda, the major
shareholder ofwhich is the Russian energy group YeSN owned by Grigorii Berezkin.126
122 Vedomosti, "About Vedomosti," ID Vedomosti, http://www.Vedomosti.ruIengi (accessed May 2,2010).
123 BBC, "The Press in Russia," BBC Monitoring, May 16, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4315129.strn(accessedMay 2,2010).
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Marina Noskovich, "«Kornsomolka» ne dostalas' «Gazpromu»," RBK Daily, January 22,2007,
http://www.rbcdaily.ruI2007/01/22/media/263943 (accessed May 2,2010).
36
Unofficial sources127 claim that Berezkin has close ties with government-owned
Gazprom, the largest extractor of natural gas in the world.
Rossiiskaia Gazeta
Established by the government in 1990, Rossiiskaia Gazeta is the main
government-owned newspaper. 128 It publishes all new laws in their entirety, as well as
news and analytical articles on political and social issues in Russia and abroad. The
newspapers website cites the surveys that define its readers as "even -tempered adults
inclined to conservative views.,,129
Moskovskii Komosomolets (MK)
MK is a mass-circulation daily newspaper that tends to criticize the Federal
government but to support the Moscow administration, Mayor Yurii Luzhkov in
particular,130 towards whom it "expresses broad support".l31 The informational-analytical
Group SOYA accused it ofpublishing of xenophobic articles and of extensively using "the
127 N. Nikiforov, "High Voltage," Pravda.ru, 22 December, 2003,
http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/89/355/11615 Gazprom.html (accessed May 2,2010).
128 BBC, "The Press in Russia," BBC Monitoring, May 16,2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4315129.stm(accessed May 2,2010).
129 Rossiiskaia Gazeta, "About," ID Rossiiskaia Gazeta, http://www.rg.ru/about.html (accessed May 2,
2010).
130 Open Source Center, "Russia - Source Descriptors of Key Russian Media," Open Source Center Media
Aid, December 6, 2007, www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/russian-media.pdf(accessedMay 2,2010).
131 BBC, "The Press in Russia," BBC Monitoring, May 16,2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4315129.stm(accessedMay 2,2010).
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language of racial hatred.,,132 These accusations were based on annual monitoring of the
language of the Russian Media in terms of the usage of xenophobic words and
expressions. 133 The newspaper belongs to ZAG Moskovskii Komsomolets. The newspaper's
editor-in-chief, Pavel Gusev, is believed to be the owner of the publishing house. 134
Novaia Gazeta
It is a newspaper that is published three times a week and is considered to be
liberal and openly oppositional to the Russian government. 135 It is well known for its
investigative journalism136 and critical coverage of Russian political and sociallife. 137 In
the last eight years, four journalists from Novaia Gazeta have been murdered,138 among
them - famous investigative journalist and human rights activist Anna Politkovskaia. The
newspaper belongs to the ANoJ39 Novaia Gazeta. According to the BBC Press Monitoring
132 Galina Kozhevnikova, 2007. Iazyk vrazhdy i vybory: federalnyi i regionalnyi urovni. Po rnaterialam
monitoringa materialov oseni 2007. On-line at: http://xeno.sova-center.ruJ213716E/21728E3/B2A44F2
133 http://xeno.sova-center.ruJ213716E (accessed May 2,2010).
134 BBC, "The Press in Russia," BBC Monitoring, May 16, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4315129.stm (accessed May 2,2010).
135 Russia Profile, "Novaia Gazeta," Russia Profile, Culture Now, April 26 2010,
http://www.russiaprofile.org/resources/culture/novaya gazeta (accessed May 2, 2010).
136 BBC, "The Press in Russia," BBC Monitoring, May 16, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4315129.stm(accessed May 2,2010).
137 Russia Profile, "Novaia Gazeta," Russia Profile, Culture Now, April 26 2010,
http://www.russiaprofile.org/resources/culture/novaya gazeta (accessed May 2,2010).
138 Ibid.
139"ANO," or "avnonomnaia nekommercheskaia organizatsiia" is translated as "autonomous non-
commercial organization."
data, the ANO Novaia Gazeta was previously owned solely by employees, but in June
2006 "former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and wealthy businessman Alexandr
Lebedev purchased a 49% stake,,,140 becoming the newspaper's minority owners.
!zvestiia
!zvestiia, a daily newspaper, was established in the Soviet Union. It is a part of
OA0141 !zvestiia, which was bought in 2005 by the governmentally owned Gazprom-
Media. This event, according to some observers, resulted in the newspaper "adopting a
clear pro-Kremlin line.,,142 In 2008 its majority stake was sold to the SOGAZ insurance
company, owned by St. Petersburg-based Bank Rossiia, whose co-owner Yurii
Kovalchuk "is widely reported to be a close associate of Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin.,,143
Nezavisimaia Gazeta (NG)
NG is a daily Moscow newspaper focused on the analysis of political and social
issues. It used to belong to the oligarch Boris Berezovskii, who is now in exile. ZAO
Nezavisimaia Gazeta, that publishes the newspaper, was bought by Konstantin
140 BBC, "The Press in Russia," BBC Monitoring, May 16, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiJeurope/4315129.stm(accessedMay 2,2010).
141"OAO," or "otkrytoe aktsionemoe obshchestvo," is translated as "open joint-stock company."
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Remchukov in 2005, who at the time was a Russian government adviser, 144 and who in
2007 became Gazeta's editor-in-chief.
Vremia Novostei
This newspaper is published five times a week and is focused on Russian politics
and social life. It is officially owned by NP (non-commercial partnership) Publishing
house Vremia. Vremia Novostei is believed to be tied to Alexandr Voloshin,,,145 chairman
ofNorilsk Nickel who served as the head of the Russian presidential administration from
1999 until his resignation on October 29,2003. Nevertheless, it is considered to be a
liberal newspaper that "sometimes criticizes the government.,,146
As we have seen from this brief media ownership overview, these foremost
leading Russian newspapers have different ownership structures and also differ in the
frequency of their publication. Most ofthe outlets (six out often) are owned by ZAD's
(c1osedjoint stock companies). One newspaper is officially owned by the government
(Rossiiskaia Gazeta), another by DAD (open joint stock company), another by AND
(autonomous non-commercial company), and another by NP (non-commercial
partnership). Seven out the ten companies that own the newspapers, however, according
144 Ibid.
145 Aleksei Makarkin, "Lichnyi politicheskii defoll. Voloshin: Politik-innovator," Kompromat.ru,
December 2001, On-line at: http://www.comprornal.ru/pagel1381.htm (accessed May 2,2010); Andrei
Zolotov, Jr., "Gazprom Gives Jordan the Boot," The Moscow Times, 20 January 2003,
http://www.themoscowtimes.comlbusiness/article/gazprom-gives-jordan-the-bootl240999.html (accessed
May 2,2010).
146 Open Source Center, "Russia - Source Descriptors of Key Russian Media," Open Source Center Media
Aid, December 6,2007, www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/russian-media.pdf(accessed May 2,2010).
to the unofficial sources (articles in the newspapers, media databases, such as BBC
Monitoring, etc.), belong to businessmen who have direct ties with the current
government. Therefore, what should be considered are not the official structures of the
media (ZAD, DAD, NP) but the level ofloyalty towards the government of the
businessmen who de facto own the publishing houses, and the extent to which they
personally interfere with the work process of the newspapers that belong to them.
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CHAPTER IV
HYPOTHESES
The assumptions from the analysis ofRussian media laws, publications in
newspapers, and internet sources can be reduced to a set of formal hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Soviet-era journalists are more predisposed towards self-censorship than
post-Soviet era journalists
Many social and media analysts have hypothesized that people in Russia,
journalists in particular, can be divided into "Soviet" and "post-Soviet," with "Soviet"
journalists being more commonly predisposed to being controlled by the state due to their
previous experience of working and living under the Soviet censorship, and "post-Soviet"
journalists being less inclined to tolerate governmental oppression.
Thus, Svetlana Juskevits, in her research "Professional Roles of Contemporary
Russian Journalists," in writing about "two generations of the journalists" (Soviet and
post-Soviet), states that Soviet journalists are "shaped by the State and were under its
complete control," and therefore they are less accustomed to freedom ofthe speech and
are more easily restricted by the government than "post-Soviet" journalists.147
147Svetlana Juskevits, "Professional Roles of Contemporary Russian Journalists," presented in the 15th
Nordic Conference on Media and Communication Research, Reykjavik Iceland, II-13th August 200 I,
www.nordicom.gu.se/mrliceland/papers/nine/SJuskevits.doc (accessed May 2,2010).
42
Antony Jones, speaking ofjournalists who proceeded from the Soviet era, points
out that they cannot be called professional journalists due to the lack of experience of
writing without being censored by the govemment. 148
Journalists Aleksandr Podrabinek and Anna Politkovskaia have written that it is
hard to get rid of the "Soviet mentality" and "hereditory memory"149 of the Soviet times,
especially for those who were educated in Soviet Russia. Colin Sparks, speaking of the
contemporary Russian broadcasting system states that "the old state broadcasters of the
communist epoch have survived as institutions, and many of their staff remain the
same.,,150
At the same time, previously analyzed data about the laws and regulations passed
in the post-Soviet period, under Putin's presidency, show that Soviet influence is not
necessarily the primary factor in the formation of self-censorship among journalists.
In my survey I will test the hypothesis that Soviet journalists are more inclined to
exercise self-censorship than post-Soviet journalists. Journalists are considered "Soviet"
if they started their careers before 1991, and "post-Soviet" - if they became journalists
after 1991. Testing this hypothesis will help us understand whether self-censorship
should be seen as the consequence of a Soviet mentality, or whether it can be analyzed
148 Antony Jones, "Professionalization," Russia in Flux, 85.
149 Alexandr Podrabinek, "Ne nado podrazhat vlasti!" Gazeta.ru, March 5th, 2009,
http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2009/03/05 a 2952859.shtml (accessed May 2,2010).
150 Colin Sparks, and Anna Reading, Communism, capitalism, and the mass media (London: SAGE
Publications, 1998), 174.
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within the framework of the post-Soviet era, with contemporary events and regulations as
the main basis for its existence.
Hypothesis 2: Self-censorship is caused by editorial censorship
According to the "totalitarian" approach towards the Russian media, developed by
Siebert et all 51, there is a strong interdependence between censorship imposed by the
editor of the outlet and self-censorship practiced by the journalists themselves; when
censorship "works itself down the chain,,152 Following this theory, we can assume that
the higher the percentage of information critical of the government that is censored by the
editor, the higher the percentage of material that a journalist would delete from his article
of his own will. In Richter's research we read that journalists are "forced to self-
censor,,,153 and with self-censorship being defined as "constraints that journalists apply
in-house under external pressure as they determine to what extent they can exercise
freedom of expression in the coverage of political events.,,154 Kolesnikov, describing the
relationship between editor and journalist, assumes that while "an editor-in-chief always
makes sure that his heads of departments do not deviate from the official line, they, in
151 Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm, Four Theories ofthe Press: the Authoritarian,
Libertarian, Social Responsibility, and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press Should Be and Do,
134.
152 Daniel Scheschkewitz, "Critical reporting? No thanks - Russian media under state and self-censorship,"
March 5, 2010, Deutsche Welle, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0..5518566.00.html (accessed May 2,
2010).
153 Andrei Rikhter, "Post-Soviet Perspective On Censorship and Freedom of the Media," 315.
154 Ibid., 314.
44
tum, have no desire to lose their jobs over a political mistake and comb their journalists'
pieces obsessively," and journalists, subsequently, "weigh every word, every thought,
everyexpression.,,155
Hypothesis 3: Journalists who practice self-censorship when they write articles for the
newspapers they work for publish more courageous articles on-line
Recent studies of the Russian media have indicated the internet as a niche that is
relatively free from censorship and self-censorship. Robert Sanders, in his article "New
Media, New Russians, New Abroad,,,156 writes about the Russian cyberspace, or Runet,"
and its "capacity to provide unfiltered access to information and news.,,157 Sanders states
that the internet in Russia is the only forum of media with "freedom of information"
which cannot be controlled by the government. He also mentions that Russian web use is
steadily growing due to several factors, such as "the increasing convergence of mobile
telephony and Internet access,,,158 as well as "the increasing prosperity of Russians.,,159
The author compares Russian cyberspace with the popularity ofblogging in Russia to the
Soviet-time samizdat, a phenomenon that "appeared in the 1950s and was simultaneously
155 Andrei Kolesnikov, "Freedom of expression: for what? It's written in to the Russian constitution but no
one takes it for real," 21.
156 Robert Sanders, "New Media, New Russians, New Abroad" in The post-Soviet Russian media:
conflicting signals, edited by Birgit Beumers, Stephen C. Hutchings, and Natalia Rulyova (London:
Routledge, 2009), 191-207.
157 Ibid., 199.
158 Ibid., 200.
159 Ibid.
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a mechanism for reproduction of and institution for dissemination of unavailable
texts.,,160 Calling internet a contemporary samizdat, Sanders claims that they have many
common features - a "self-made" character" and an absence of "interference of
government censorship, editorial review boards or any other information-regulating
entity.,,161 There are also more modem features that can be attributed to the new, "virtual"
samizdat - its consumption is possible without regard for geographic location, and it is
available to everyone, which has created an informational field where oppositional
articles and blog posts that criticize the government are neighboring with pro-
governmental propaganda or nationalistic lozenges.
Vlad Strukov in his work "Russia's Internet media policies,,162 writes about the
dominant state official's attitude towards the internet, "general misapprehension as
regards the Web's extraterritorial and ephemeral nature; the complexity of notions of
authorship; and their general lack of authority pertaining when it comes to new, digital
technologies.,,163 Strukov looks at possible ways of governmental control over Russian
cyberspace, writing that with the rapid development of technologies there appears more
ways of controlling internet space. For instance, now it is possible to track "a user's
internet activity through the "digital trace," that is, a record of online movements and
160 Ibid., 203.
161 Ibid.
162 VIad Strukov, "Russia's internet media policies" in The post-Soviet Russian media: conflicting signals,
edited by Birgit Beumers, Stephen C. Hutchings, and Natalia Rulyova (London: Routledge, 2009), 208-
222.
163 Ibid., 209.
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publications."164 There have already been a number of governmental attempts to control
internet-publications by applying to them criminal, civil and media laws. For example, in
2007 a 23-year old Russian blogger named Dmitrii Shirinkin from Perm posted a
fictional story on his blog inspired by the Virginia Tech Shooting. In this story, which
was written as an angry satire, he wrote about buying a gun and going to shoot people.
He also wrote that he "hated Putin, hated Kasparov, hated McDonald's, hated Dom-2
(popular reality show), hated metro, hated Russian provincialism." Shirinkin was accused
of "falsely warning of a terror threat." He was found guilty for the false announcement of
a planned terrorist act based on his post, and a fine of20.000 rubles (approximately $800
USD) was imposed upon him. The court came to the conclusion that "the resource (a site
on the internet) can be considered to be a part of the mass media... in these circumstances
the court comes to the conclusion that the announcement of Shirinkin was made in the
mass media". Although cases like this are not numerous, they cause worry among human
rights activists and journalists in Russia.
Another Russian blogger was accused of "inCiting hate" against the police.
According to the Komi regional prosecutor, the blog post of the 21-year old musician
Savva Terent'ev contained "a direct call aimed at inciting hatred or hostility, as well as
harming the dignity of ... a particular social group - policemen."165 In February, 2007,
164 Ibid., 210.
165 Marianna Tipshchenko, "Blogger Handed Suspended Sentence," July 8, 2008, The Moscow Times,
http://www.themoscowtimes.comlnews/articlelb10gger-handed-suspended-sentence/368793 .html (accessed
May 2,2010).
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Savva wrote a post in his friend's blog166 that the police are "dumb, uneducated
representatives of the animal world" and should be burnt periodically in town squares
"like at Auschwitz.,,167
Terent'ev was summoned to the local prosecutor's office almost immediately
after his comment appeared and was accused of "inciting hatred or enmity.,,168 The
blogger's ten month-long criminal trial resulted in a guilty verdict. The musician received
a year-long conditional probation169.
While the internet appears to be an important component of the media which is
less restricted than traditional media, there are also dangers of being prosecuted for what
have been published on-line. In this thesis I would like to answer a specific question - do
journalists who practice self-censorship in the newspapers tend to publish articles critical
of the state on-line?
Hypothesis 4: Media ownership directly affects the level of self-censorship among
journalists
The analysis of media ownership conducted in Chapter III shows that there are the
three types of newspapers: joint-stock companies, non-commercial organizations and
166 Boris Surano's BIog, http://suranov.livejouma1.com(accessed May 2,2010).
167 "Terent'ev is being sued for his LJ commentary," Lenta.ru (accessed May 2, 2010); available from
http://lenta.ruIstorY!terentvev/ (accessed May 2, 2010).
168 Mike Eckel, "Incendiary Blogger's Case Is Sent to Court," March 14, 2008, "The St. Petersburg Times,"
http://www.sptimes.ruIindex.php?action id=2&story id=25320&highlight=russian%20blogge (accessed
May 2,2010).
169 Ibid.
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governmental property. However, de facto almost all of these outlets belong to individual
owners close to the Russian government. The only exceptions are Novaia Gazeta, 51 % of
which is owned by the employees, and Vedomosti, that belongs to a foreign corporation.
The question is - what is the interrelation between the media ownership and self-
censorship?
Media analysts widely discuss the affect of ownership on Russian media since it
ceased to be the sole property of the government, which, in the end, resulted in the re-
consolidation of the media in the hands of businessmen loyal to the government. 170 At the
same time, nothing has been said about the affect of media ownership upon the level of
self-censorship amongjoumalists. The findings of the current survey will allow us to
examine this aspect of Russian media and test the hypothesis that a connection exists
between the ownership of a given newspaper and self-censorship.
[70 Andrei Zolotov, "The Roots ofNTV's Difficulties Dig Deeply into Political Turf," Nieman Reports 55,
no. 2 (2001), 85-87; Romesh Ratnesar, Mike Billips, Barry Hillenbrand, Jane Walker, Yurii Zarakhovich,
"Putin's Media Blitz." Time Europe, 157, no. 17 (2001), 26-27.
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CHAPTER V
DATA ANALYSIS
Sample
The data used to assess hypotheses about the prevalence of self-censorship come
from my own survey of Moscow newspaper reporters.
A sampling frame was developed by listing all the journalists, who work in the
departments of politics, society, urban life and investigations at each of the top ten
Moscow newspapers from March 2009 to March 2010. Next, a random sample of 55
journalists was chosen and I attempted to contact them each by phone. 40 agreed to
participate, a response rate of73%. At most papers I spoke with more than one political
reporter (See Appendix I for the questionnaire).
All journalists were told that the information they provide would be confidential
and their names would not be disclosed. All interviews were conducted in Russian. No
audio records of the interviews were taken, only shorthand notes, which I transcribed and
translated.
General overview
In this survey, journalists were asked questions which can thematically be divided
into two main groups. The first group was designed to promote discussion about the
journalists' working experience. Basic descriptive statistics show how long a given
journalist has been at work in his profession and the type of work that he does (Table 1;
all tables are in Appendix II)
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The length of working experience of the journalists helps us to understand whether the
journalist received his education in the Soviet or post- Soviet period.
The second set of questions elicits the journalists' responses concerning editorial
censorship and self-censorship. The questions were formulated in such a way that the
words "censorship" and "self-censorship" are avoided due to their ambiguous nature and
the possibility of subjective interpretation. Therefore, in order to define whether
journalists experienced editorial censorship, they are asked two questions: 1). In the last
four years, has it occurred that the editor eliminated from your article any words or
phrases criticizing the Russian government? 2). In the last four years, has it occurred that
the editor refused to publish your article that contained information critical of the Russian
government? In regard to self-censorship, journalists are asked a single question: In the
last four years, has it occurred that, in order to publish your article, you yourself decided
not to include facts that negatively characterize the Russian government?
Most of the respondents (60%), stated that they write articles as well as edit texts
written by other journalists, with remaining 40% stating that they only write articles and
do not work as editors (Table 1). However, most of the latter journalists commented that
they have tried editing and did not like it, so although they were offered work as an
editor, they decided not to pursue it. It is very common for journalists in Russia to
combine writing and editing, because an editor's job is higher paid. The fact that most of
the journalists interviewed have previous experience in editing articles written by others
proves that they are familiar with the editing process and can recognize when the editing
of an article has a purely stylistic basis and in which cases it is based on eliminating
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phrases, words, or facts that are critical of the state; a process that is similar to
censorship.
The majority of the interviewees (80%) publish articles every day (52.5 %) and
every week (27.5%).20% publish their texts monthly or less than once a month. 70% of
those interviewed write about politics on a daily or weekly basis, 27.5 % - monthly or
less than monthly (Table 2). Some of the interviewees explained the lower frequency of
their political writing by the fact that they work as investigative journalists and it takes a
month or more to write one investigative article. Another explanation for the lower
frequency of publications is their editing work, which requires a lot oftime and interferes
with writing articles. Several journalists commented that the borders between "political"
and "non-political" writing are sometimes blurred. One of the interviewees stated that
while he was not specializing in politics and was mainly writing about the city planning,
and real estate, he commonly had to deal with political issues because real estate business
in Moscow is closely affiliated with the Moscow and Federal government. He stated that,
as far as the owner ofthe biggest construction company in Moscow is the wife of the
mayor, "criticizing the construction of a certain building means criticizing some high-end
state bureaucrat." Another interviewee mentioned that "today, whatever you write about
is politics; although I am trying not to get into politics too much, it is almost impossible
to stay away from it, unless you are working for the yellow press and write about
celebrities."
Most journalists (94.9%) have stated that they have criticized the government in
their articles (Table 3). Several journalists admitted that they have criticized the
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government in their articles by quoting direct speech of the oppositional commentators,
or just stating facts that by themselves critique the government, but did not comment on
those facts or direct quotations. They explained their behavior by citing the necessity of
being "careful" in order to be able to publish in the outlets that they are working for.
The results of the survey show that self-censorship is prevalent among journalists;
more than half ofjournalists (51.3%) affirmed that in the last four years they have
practiced self-censorship, deciding not to include certain facts that are critical of state
authorities in their articles in order to have their articles published (Table 4).
Editorial censorship occurs, but it is less frequent. While 40% ofjournalists stated
that in the last four years of work their editors have eliminated from their articles words
or phrases criticizing the state (Table 4), only 30% agreed that their editor in the last four
years refused to publish their articles because they contained information critical ofthe
Russian government (Table 5). This is consistent with the idea that a significant level of
self-censorship and "soft" editorial censorship (when an editor eliminates parts of an
article), makes it unlikely for the editor to reject the whole article for its political
"incorrectness." Therefore, in further analysis I will speak mostly of "soft" editorial
censorship, considering that "hard" editorial censorship occurs in the same circumstances
as "soft" censorship, but less frequently.
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Hypothesis l: Soviet-era journalists are more predisposed towards self-censorship than
post-Soviet era journalists
The results of the survey are not consistent with the hypothesis that journalists
who started their career in the Soviet era are practicing more self-censorship than their
younger colleagues who began working after the collapse of the Soviet system and,
consequently, at the time when censorship was no longer legal.
According to the data, 54.5% of "Soviet" journalists have not practiced self-
censorship, while 45.4% have. At the same time, 46.1 % of "post-Soviet" journalists have
not practiced self-censorship, while 53.8% have (Table 6). Therefore, the difference
between "Soviet" and "post-Soviet" journalists in terms of their willingness to exercise
self-censorship is insignificant, and even this small difference indicates that journalists of
the Soviet era practice less self-censorship than their "post-Soviet" colleagues. The same
is true of the relation to censorship that proceeds from the editor of the outlet. Overall
results show that there is very little difference between the percentage of "Soviet" and
"post-Soviet" journalists who agreed that their editors eliminated parts of their articles in
order to prevent the publication of information critical of the government. In this case, as
in the previous one, the little difference in the percentage shows that "Soviet" journalists
experience slightly more pressure from their editors, which is consistent with the idea that
their articles contain more information critical of the government than that of their
younger colleagues.
54
One respondent commented that journalists who were most active in the early
nineties are much more oppositional in their judgments than those who started later.
Another journalist said, "I am a journalist of the old school, so my articles are sometimes
too much... I still write as I was in the nineties." As I discussed in Chapters II and III, the
2000s are an era marked by the Second Chechen War, war against terrorism, and are
characterized by the appearance of legal restrictions imposed upon the printed press.
Therefore, it is possible to suggest that these facts partially explain why the older
journalists act with less self-restriction than the younger ones, who started their careers in
the late 90s and early 2000s.
Another explanation for "Soviet" journalists exercising less self-censorship than
their younger colleagues is that the former can be characterized as members of
intelligentsiia, or Soviet intellectuals. Many of them were oppositional to state authorities
even in the Soviet era. Although very few were brave enough to explicitly express their
protest, after the collapse of the Soviet Union these people were more willing to openly
criticize the government. One of the examples is Vladimir Pozner, a famous Russian
journalist who worked for the magazine "Soviet Life" and wrote articles about the
greatness ofRussia during the Soviet period. As Pozner describes in his memoirs
"Parting with Illusions," although he experienced censorship from his editor, he did not
dare to argue with him. 171 He explains that he did not believe the government to be
entirely wrong, and that he had illusions about the Soviet system, although understood
171 Vladimir Pozner, Parting with illusions (New York: Atlantic MontWy Press, 1990).
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some of its faults. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Pozner became a very
famous oppositional journalist who challenges governmental decisions in his TV
programs, books and articles, arguing that "the press still should not trust the
government."l72
Another world-famous oppositional Russian journalist, Anna Politkovskaia, who
openly criticized Russian government and was killed in 2006, also started her journalistic
career in the Soviet era, becoming ajournalist for Izvestiia newspaper in 1982. 173
Hypothesis 2: Self-censorship is caused by editorial censorship
The survey shows that there is a complex interrelation between editorial
censorship and journalistic self-censorship, which does not prove that editorial censorship
affects the level of self-censorship among journalists.
The percentage ofjournalists who exercise self-censorship is roughly the same
both in outlets where editors censor their articles, and in outlets whose editors do not
impose any censorship (Table 4). At the same time, there is a very strong correlation
between those journalists who prefer not to publish any articles critical of the state and
editorial censorship (editor eliminated parts of their articles that criticized the state).
Those journalists who have claimed to have experienced strong editorial censorship
prefer not to publish any articles critical of the government (Table 7).
172 Vladimir Pozner, and Irina Karpenko, ""I Will Not 'Go After' Anyone". Russian Politics and Law 39,
no. 1 (2001),92.
173 Sergei Tepliakov, "Za chto ubili Anny Politkovskyiu?" Izvestiia, October 9,2006,
http://www./zvestia.ru/incidentJartic1e3097332/ (accessed May 2,2010).
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On the one hand, these results are consistent with the possibility that
contemporary Russian journalists who work in popular Moscow newspapers know well
the policies that are practiced within each outlet, and in the case of strong editorial
censorship prefer not to contradict these policies and not to raise any issues critical ofthe
government in their articles.
On the other hand, journalists who do publish articles critical of the government
seem to know well the "rules of the game" and are aware of the particular topics that are
not supposed to be raised in the Russian media. They efficiently self-censor their texts
according to these rules, which are not directly related to their editor's preferences, but
based on their personal and social experience. This theory can find support in the
comments that the respondents give on self-censorship. For example, one ofthe
interviewees commented that there is a number of established topics that are not
supposed to be discussed in press, and "everyone knows them," so when it comes to
writing, journalists know what they can and what they cannot write about. They either
avoid writing on this topic or carefully camouflage it so that it does not attract too much
attention. The topics that are not to be written on are the following: 1). Putin's personal
life (absolute taboo); 2). Personal life of Medvedev and other first-rank bureaucrats; 3).
Weapon trade (a good example is the situation with the ship Arctic Sea); 4). Ramzan
Kadyrov and the situation in Chechnya (it is dangerous for one's life); 5). Baturina's
business (Elena Baturina is the richest woman in Russia, the owner ofthe constructing
company Inteko, and the wife ofYurii Luzhkov, the mayor ofMoscow since 1992
(Baturina is famous for her (successful) lawsuits against journalists and outlets that
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publish any criticism of her company or herself)174; 6). Investigation of terrorist acts. The
same author stressed the fact that if a journalist covers a "tabooed" topic in his or her
article, the other newspapers would not follow suit, even if the journalist discloses
something revealing about the misconduct of the state. Such behavior, according to the
journalist, leads to the "death" of a topic, when it is mentioned once and then forgotten.
The journalist explains this phenomenon as "the lack of solidarity between journalists."
On the other hand, solidarity in keeping silence can also be an explanation. All
journalists, no matter what outlet they are working for, share more or less the same
informational space and follow similar sets of rules. Therefore, journalists share
solidarity in what they are not supposed to publish, and at the same time lack solidarity in
working together towards an investigation of a common problem. Hence, the level of
self-censorship that they practice is very much their personal choice.
The topic that was stated by many journalists as the most "problematic" is the
private life and personal qualities of either the Prime Minister Vladimir Putin or the
President Dmitrii Medvedev. Both editors and journalists avoid this topic, and many
journalists refer to it as to the "absolute taboo." Journalists confirmed that their editors
had eliminated parts of their articles that contained personal criticism of either Putin or
Medvedev. Examples of "personal criticism" ofPutin and Medvedev thatjoumalists
eliminate from their articles demonstrate the extent of the banned topics. One of the
174 Among the most well-known court cases iniciated by Baturina's Inteco are the ones against The Sunday
Times and Forbes (Russia); see "Russia's Richest Woman Sues Forbes Magazine," February 14,2007,
Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, http://www.rferl.org/contentlBackgrounderEmbedded/107471O.html
(accessed May 2,2010); Roy Greenslade, "Sunday Times Sued for Libel," 29 November 2009, Greenslade
Blog, Guardian.co.uk, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/greenslade/2009/nov/29/sundaytimes-medialaw
(accessed May 2,2010).
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journalists stated that he decided not to publish an article with information about the
height of the President ofRussia in comparison to the height of the Italian Prime Minister
Silvio Berlusconi. The journalist noticed that although Putin was two centimeters shorter
than Berlusconi during the Summit of the G8 he somehow managed to look taller than
the Italian leader. He edited this piece and it never went to print. Among other cases of
"dangerous" topics that the respondents claimed to deliberately cut from their own
materials or not mention are the personal wealth of Putin, Putin's and Medvedev's
"tandem" and its political strangeness, Putin's family life, his wife and daughters,
criticism ofPutin's politics towards Russian sport, foreign politicians' negative
comments about Putin, newsmakers' comments on the political actions ofMedvedev and
Putin. The phenomenon of the taboo on the personal criticism of the leading politicians is
an interesting topic for further research; the most logical conclusion that we can make on
the basis of this finding is that Russian politics are formed around strong personalities
and not that much around the laws, what Shevtsova, Hale and McFaul call
"superpresidential regime" or "superpresidency."] 75
Having analyzed the comments ofthe journalists, 1 can roughly divide them into
three groups. The first one includes those who prefer not to engage in self-censorship,
although they know that their editors may delete text or kill stories. As one of the
interviewees stated, "let the editor himself spoil his karma." Another respondent
commented, "I write what 1 feel, and then the editor corrects it, making it look right."
175 Liliia Shevtsova, "The Problem of Executive Power in Russia," Journal ofDemocracy 11, no. 1 (2000),
32-39; Henry Hale, "Iabloko and the Challenge of Building a Liberal Party in Russia," Europe-Asia Studies
56, no. 7 (2004), 993-1020; Michael McFaul, "Russian Democracy: Still not a Lost Cause," The
Washington Quarterly 23, no. 1 (2000), 161-172.
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One journalist stated, "I know that 1 sometimes become unnecessarily critical of the state,
when my criticism is not based on facts but on my emotions, so 1 accept the editor's
corrections."
The second group includes those who prefer to avoid writing anything that they
think their editor would cut or rewrite out of convenience and for the faster publication of
an article. These journalists prefer to exercise self-censorship when it comes to
problematic topics. For them, self-censorship has two principal methods: first, not
mentioning certain facts, or eliminating pieces from a text; second, trying to fonnulate
critical materials and facts in a way that makes it look less "extreme." Journalists often
describe the latter method as "softening the angles," "being more accurate" or "trying to
be more cautious," as well as "tricking the editor through the fonnulation of "banned"
facts and trying to disguise them and sneak them in." There are other ways that
journalists use in order to publish controversial infonnation, such as publishing
"problematic" articles in other outlets or publishing them on-line (I address this below).
The third group includes those who cease to write any criticism about the
government. This group is the least numerous, while the number ofjournalists in the first
and second group is roughly the same.
The director of communications at the World Association of Newspapers,
Kilman, when speaking about the relationship between censorship and self-censorship,
affinned that "censorship leads to self-censorship because it causes reporters to question
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what is 'allowed' and what is not.,,176 The conclusions drawn from the data obtained in
this survey take towards further step of self-censorship. It appears to exist independently
from editorial censorship, and even those journalists who work in different newspapers
share information on "dangerous" topics. Therefore, there is an informational space that
provides a list of "dangerous" topics. It is not editorial censorship, but this space,
common for the journalists who work in the popular Moscow dailies and weeklies, that
defines the current topics which are chosen to be censored. Journalists who are exposed
to censorship from their editors, and those who are not practice self-censorship to the
same extent. As we can see from the comments, it is a matter of personal working
techniques and methods, and a matter of convenience. The most common reaction to
editorial censorship is either ignoring it, letting the editor make any changes he wants; or
reacting by only changing the form but not the content.
Hypothesis 3: Journalists who practice self-censorship when they write articles for the
newspapers they work for publish more courageous articles on-line
In this survey I am answering the following questions: Do journalists prefer to
publish articles critical of the state on-line? Is there any relationship between the level of
self-censorship that they apply to their writings and their willingness to publish
something on-line? Does it feel safer to publish information critical of the government on
the internet rather than in the outlets they work for?
176 As cited in Simons, Greg, and Dmitrii Strovskii, "Censorship in Contemporary Russian Journalism in
the Age of the War Against Terrorism,"European Journal o/Communication 21, no. 2 (2006): 191.
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Journalists were asked whether they published in their blogs or other internet-
sources (such as on-line newspapers and news agencies), any articles critical of the
government that could not be published in the newspapers they work at.
12.8% of the journalists answered "yes" to this question (Table 8). Two main
explanations were given for the negative answers. Roughly half of the journalists claim
that their contract does not allow them to publish any article on-line without the approval
of the newspaper that they work for. Another half explains this by the fact that they are
too "old-fashioned" to publish anything on the internet. However, a significant number of
the latter express their wish to start up their own blog or to publish something on-line in
the future.
Although the percentage ofjournalists who publish on-line is small, the data show
that 80% of those who posted their articles on the internet practice self-censorship, while
only 40% experienced censorship from their editors (Tables 10 and 11). This suggests
that journalists use different standards when writing for the outlets where they work then
for internet sources, news agencies, and blogs. They are more cautious in the printed
press and avoid writing critical notions about the government, while on the internet they
are more explicit in their opinions about state authorities. Journalists who published
articles on-line said that in that medium they could more explicitly express their opinions
and attitudes, while in the printed press they were required to use a neutral tone. Most of
the journalists interviewed stated that the decisive factor for publishing something critical
about the government is the ability to name the source. In other words, as one journalist
explained, "You cannot write: 'Minister ofFinance Ivanov is incompetent, he cannot
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count,' - said one of his classmates'; you can only write: 'Minister Ivanov is
incompetent, he cannot count,' - said one of his classmates, Petr Petrov." Most of the
journalists have noticed that in the last several years the necessity to reveal all the sources
of information that criticizes the state has significantly lowered their ability to publish
any criticism at all, as far as it is hard to get information without promising anonymity to
the source. As one of the journalists said, "sometimes we prefer not to publish the
comment because we do not want to harm our source." He added that "in Russia, the
sources almost never speak for the record, and all Russian journalism is basically built
upon anonymous sources, which lowers its quality." Internet publications allow
journalists to publish critical information and be more evasive about their sources,
although the fact that the government applies criminal and media laws to articles and blog
posts published on-line makes most of the journalists treat internet publications with
caution.
Hypothesis 4: Media ownership directly affects the level of self-censorship among
journalists
The results show that there is no significant relationship between self-censorship,
editorial censorship and the official ownership structure (ZAG, GAG, etc.) (Table 11).
These results are consistent with my previous analysis of the two levels of ownership
structures in the Russian media: the "official" (publishing houses that belong to non-
commercial partnerships and joint-stock companies) and "unofficial" (individual
businessmen who stand behind these companies). While ZAGs, GAGs, NPs and other
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fOTITIS of ownership have different structures that, supposedly, should affect media in
different ways, unofficially most of the media outlets are owned by the individual
businessmen. Their personal tastes and political views tum out to be more important than
the official ownership structure. Thus, one of the respondents claimed that he tries "to
avoid any criticism of the native republic of the owner of the publishing house," and
"considering that you cannot speak of this republic without criticizing it," he prefers "not
to write about it at all." Another respondent stated that he does not write anything bad
about a "certain bureaucrat who is friends with our owner. .. everybody knows it, and
everyone avoids criticizing him, which allows us to criticize anything else."
Therefore, in order to understand the relationship between the ownership structure
and media policies we need to have a closer look at the personalities of the owners, their
political attitudes and behaviors, as well as the extent of their participation in the policies
of the newspapers they own. Such research could become a continuation of the current
thesis.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis examines the contemporary Russian printed press and, in particular,
the way that journalists who work in the ten most popular socio-political Russian
newspapers practice self-censorship and are subjected to editorial censorship. In
exploring the problems of self-censorship in ten particular outlets, this thesis offers the
answer to the more general question: To what extent does self-censorship exist in the
contemporary Russian press, and what principal factors affect its existence?
In seeking the stimulus for censorship, the thesis explores the question of media
ownership in Russia since the collapse ofthe Soviet Union in 1991, and studies the laws
and regulations related to freedom of the press that the government has issued since 1991,
as well as the events that significantly affected that freedom (Wars in Chechnya and
terrorist acts in Russia). Finally, it analyzes the findings from the survey in the context of
the previously studied theoretical data.
A recap of the findings as a result of this thesis research includes the following
conclusions:
Although there is no legal censorship in Russia, contemporary Russian journalists
practice significant self-censorship and, to a lesser extent, editorial censorship. Editorial
censorship is most commonly practiced through eliminating certain parts of text by the
editor (phrases or words critical of the government) and less commonly by refraining
from publishing the entire article. Nevertheless, even those journalists who experience
-----------------------------------------
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self-censorship and editorial censorship claim to criticize various aspects of the
government in their publications.
The data shows that journalists who started their careers in the Soviet Union do
not practice self-censorship to a greater extent than journalists who started their careers
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. More than that, the results of the survey show that
"Soviet" journalists are less inclined to self-censorship than their younger colleagues. It
leads to the possibility that self-censorship in the contemporary Russian press is different
from that which existed in Soviet times, has its own dynamics, and is formed by disparate
factors. There is the whole new generation ofRussian journalists who started their careers
in the post-Soviet era, and who still exercise self-censorship. Hence, in the further
analysis of self-censorship in Russian press it would be essential to study it not as a direct
continuation of the Soviet past but in the context of contemporary circumstances and
events.
The data do not confirm the hypothesis that editorial censorship directly affects
self-censorship. The results of the survey show that there is an equal percentage of
journalists who practice self-censorship among those who have experienced editorial
censorship and among those who have not. It is consistent with the idea that se1f-
censorship in the contemporary Russian printed press does not necessarily have a vertical
structure (come from the editor). Journalists who decide to censor their own articles
might make decisions based on their personal experience and a certain "common
knowledge." It is possible to suggest that the journalists of most of the printed
newspapers that are based in Moscow share this "common knowledge," as far as all the
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journalists interviewed for this thesis independently from each other named the same
topics that are considered to be "the most dangerous." Among the factors that may
influence the common journalistic knowledge about the most "dangerous" topics are the
numerous anti-terroristic acts and regulations, which the government introduced after the
Second Chechen War, as well the selective punishments of some of the most famous
journalists who crossed the line and covered those topics.
The hypothesis that journalists who practice self-censorship when they write
articles for the newspapers publish more courageous articles on-line is confirmed.
Although the number ofjournalists who publish articles in their blogs and on-line sources
proves to be relatively small, those journalists who publish articles on-line practice self-
censorship in the outlets they work for. It shows that journalists are inclined to see the
internet as a place where they can express more criticism towards authorities. However, a
significant number ofjournalists prefer not to publish their texts on-line. Some journalists
explain this tendency by their being "old-fashioned," others state that their contract does
not allow them to do so without official permission from their employer. Overall, the
respondents consider the internet to be an alternative to the printed media, and state that
internet space has more freedom than the printed press.
The data show that there is no obvious relationship between official media
ownership structure and self-censorship. The fact that Russian ownership structures are
only relatively transparent, and on the unofficial level most of the Russian media outlets
are considered to be owned by individual businessmen, may provide an explanation to
this result. At the same time, it may be partially explained by the idea that self-censorship
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among Russian journalists is not necessarily the result of the editorial policies and is
based on the common knowledge that all Moscow-based journalists who work for
popular socio-political newspapers and write about political or social issues are likely to
share.
Although self-censorship occupies a significant place in contemporary Russian
journalism, and in the printed press in particular, the Russian printed media is freer than it
is considered to be, and is not directly censored by the state. Journalists often
compromise their ability to discuss the most "dangerous" topics such as Chechnya,
terrorism and the private lives ofPutin and Medvedev, in order to continue their work as
journalists and address issues that can be criticized with greater success, such as
governmental corruption.
This work offers only the first step in the analysis of the mechanisms of self-
censorship and editorial censorship in Russia. The problems of these modem types of
censorship have been widely discussed by media analysts, journalists, and human rights
activists and represent an important problem in today's media; however, they need to be
studied further and in more detail. Understanding the mechanisms that stand behind these
"civilized" fonns of censorship can benefit media analysts in many ways, starting with
getting a clearer picture of the contemporary Russian press and ending with the ability to
make a more precise content analysis of the contemporary media in Russia. This research
suggests a number of explanations of how self-censorship in Russia works.
There is a number of possible topics for further research on this problem. One of
the suggested topics is the relationship between the real, semi-official owners of the
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publishing houses and media outlets, and their editors and journalists. Another possible
topic for further studies is the informational space that is shared by journalists who work
for the printed media in Moscow and other regions in Russia, as well as a comparative
analysis of the topics that are commonly considered taboo by Russian journalists
throughout the country.
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APPENDIX A
SURVEY: SELF-CENSORSHIP IN RUSSIAN PRINTED PRESS
English version
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Elena Rodina, a student
from the REESC department at the University of Oregon. I hope to learn about the
problem of self-censorship in contemporary Russian printed press. This research will be
used in a thesis on the same topic. You were selected as a possible participant in this study
because you are working as ajoumalist in one of the ten most popular daily newspapers in
Russia.
If you decide to participate, I will interview you, asking questions about your job and the
process of article-writing in order to understand whether you yourself or your editor
restrict the publication of information that is critical of the government. This one-time
interview will take up to ten (10) minutes, will be conducted over the phone and will be
recorded by taking notes and without using any audio or video record facilities.
The interview may take more than ten minutes (up to fifteen minutes) in case I would ask
you to specify some of your answers.
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified
with you will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission. Subject
identities will be kept confidential.
Your participation is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect
your relationship with the University of Oregon. If you decide to participate, you are free
to withdraw your consent and discontinue participation at any time without penalty.
If you have questions, contact Elena Rodina, GTF Russian Instructor, REESC, 271 PLC,
University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403, (541) 346-4001; or Professor Caleb Southworth
(advisor), 720 PLC, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403, (541) 346-5034.
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, contact the Office for
Protection ofHuman Subjects, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403, (541) 346-2510.
This Office oversees the review ofthe research to protect your rights and is not involved
with this study.
Your signature indicates that you have read and understand the information provided
above, that you willingly agree to participate, that you may withdraw your consent at any
time and discontinue participation without penalty, that you have received a copy of this
form, and that you are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies.
Name:
Tel.:
Date of the interview:
Place of work:
1. For how many years have you been working at your current position?
2. When (what year) did you start working as a professional paid journalist?
3. At your current job, you are:
a) only writing articles
b) writing articles and editing texts written by other journalists
4. How often do your articles appear in print?
a) daily
b) weekly
c) monthly
d)less than once per month
5. How often do you write about politics?
a) less than monthly
b) monthly
c) weekly
d) daily
e) other, please specify _
6. In the last four (4) years (starting with 2006), has it occurred that:
6.1 The editor eliminated from your article any words or phrases criticizing the
Russian government? If yes, give an example.
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6.2 In order to publish your article you yourself decided not to include the facts
that are negatively characterizing the Russian government? If yes, give an
example.
6.3 Your editor refused to publish your article that contained information critical
of the Russian government? If yes, give an example.
7. Have you published articles critical of the Russian government in the outlet you are
working for? If yes, give an example. Ifno, explain why.
8. In the last four (4) years (starting with 2006) has it happened that you have published
your article(s) that could not be published in the outlet you work for because oftheir
criticizm towards the government in your blog or another internet-source? If yes, how
many?
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Russian version
BbI rrpHrJIarnaeTeCb rrpHHHTb yqaCTHe B orrpoce B paMKaX HCCJIe.nOBaHHH, KOTOpOe
rrpOBO.nHTCH PO.nHHOH EJIeHOH, cTy.neHTKOH OT.neJIeHHH cPaKyJIbTeTa PyCCKOH H
BOCTOqHO-EBpOrreHCKOH KyJIbTypbI YHHBepCHTeTa OperOH. Orrpoc HarrpaBJIeH Ha
BbrnCHeHHe ypOBHH CaMOueH3ypbI B COBpeMeHHOH pOCCHHCKOH rreqaTHOH rrpecce. 3TO
HCCJIe.nOBaHHe 6y.neT HCrrOJIb30BaHO rrpH HarrHcaHHH KaH.nH.naTCKoH .nHccepTaUHH,
rrOCBHmeHHOH rrp06JIeMe CaMOueH3ypbI. BbI 6billH BbI6paHbI .nJIH yqaCTHH B .naHHOM
orrpoce rro rrpHqHHe Toro, qTO BbI HBJIHeTeCb )KypHaJIHCTOM, pa60TaIOmeM B O.nHOM H3
.neCHTH CaMbIX rrorryJIHpHbIX e)KeHe.neJIbHbIX ra3eT B POCCHH.
B CJIyqae Barnero COrJIaCHH Ha yqacTHe B orrpoce, MHOlO 6y.nyT 3a):(aHbI BorrpOCbI 0
BarneH pa60Te H rrpouecce HarrHCaHHH MaTepHaJIOB. IJ;eJIb BorrpOCOB - BbrnCHHTb,
cymecTByeT JIH KOHrpOJIb rry6JIHKaUHH, co.nep)KamHX KpHTHqeCKHe 3aMeqaHHH B
CTOpOHy rrpaBHTeJIbCTBa, co CTOpOHbI Barnero pe.naKTopa H OrpaHHqHBaeTe JIH BbI CaMH
KOJIHqeCTBO cPaKTOB, KpHTHKylOmHX POCCHHCKoe rrpaBHTeJIbCTBO, B BarnHx MaTepHaJIax.
Orrpoc 6y.neT rrpOBo.nHTbCH O.nHH pa3 H 3aHMeT .no .neCHTH (10) MHHyT. OH 6y.neT
rrpOBe.neH rro TeJIecPOHy. .5I6y.ny ocymeCTBJIHTb CHHxpOHHylO 3arrHCb pa3rOBOpa B BH.ne
3aMeTOK B 3JIeKTpOHHOM .nOKYMeHTe (rreqaTb). Pa3rOBOp He 6y.neT 3arrHcaH Ha ay.nHo-
HJIH BH.neo- HOCHTeJIH. HHTepBblO MO)KeT 3aHHTb.n0 rrHTHa):(uaTH (15) MHHyT B CJIyqae,
eCJIH HeKOTopbIe BarnH OTBeTbI rrorpe6YlOT .naJIbHeHrnHX YTOqHeHHH H rrpHMepOB.
BCH HHcPopMaUHH, rronyqeHHaH B .naHHOM orrpoce, 6y.neT OCTaBaTbCH
KOHcPe.neHUHaJIbHOH. Barne HMH B CBH3H C.naHHoH HHcPopMaUHeH CMO)KeT 6bITb
OrJIarneHO JIHrnb rrpH HaJIHqHH Barnero COrJIaCHH, B OCTaJIbHbIX CJIyqaHX Barne HMH H
MeCTO pa60TbI pa3rJIarneHbI He 6y.nyT. Barne yqacTHe B orrpoce .n06pOBOJIbHoe. Barne
perneHHe 0 TOM, yqaCTBOBaTb HJIH HeT B orrpoce HHKaK He rrOBJIHHeT Ha BarnH
OTHorneHHH CYHHBepCHTeTOM OperOHa. ECJIH BbI pernHTe yqacTBoBaTb B orrpoce, BbI
MO)KeTe H3MeHHTb Barne perneHHe B JI1060H MOMeHT 6e3 KaKHX-JIH60 rrOCJIe.nYlOmHX
caHKUHH.
B CJIyqae BorrpOCOB, rrO)KaJIyHcTa, CBH)KHTeCb CEJIeHOH PO.nHHOH rro a):(pecy REESC,
271 PLC, YHHBepcHTeT OperoHa, 1O.n)KHH, OperoH, HH.neKC: 97403, TeJI.: (541) 346-
4001; HJIH rrpocPeccopoM KaHJIe60M CaycBopToM (HayqHbIH pyKoBo.nHTeJIb) rro a):(pecy:
720 PLC, YHHBepcHTeT OperoHa, 1O.n)KHH, OperoH, HH.neKC: 97403, TeJIecPoH: (541)
346-5034.
ECJIH Y Bac B03HHKHyT BorrpOCbI 0 BarnHX rrpaBax KaK yqaCTHHKa orrpoca, rrO)KaJIyHcTa,
CBH)KHTeCb C0cPHCOM rro 3amHTe IlpaB qeJIOBeKa, YHHBepcHTeT OperoHa, 1O.n)KHH,
OperoH, HH.neKC: 97403, TeJI. (541) 346-2510. .D:aHHbIH ocPHC Ha6JIlO.naeT 3a
rrpOBe.neHHeM orrpoca CueJIblO 3amHTbI BarnHx rrpaB, HO Herrocpe.nCTBeHHO He BOBJIeqeH
B orrpoc.CTaBH Barny rro.nrrHCb, BbI corJIarnaeTeCb CTeM, qTO BbI rrpOqJIH H rrOHHJIH
HHcPopMaUHlO, rrpe.nOCTaBJIeHHylO BbIrne, qTO BbI .n06pOBOJIbHO COrJIaCHbI yqaCTBOBaTb B
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orrpoce II qTO BbI IIMeeTe rrpaBO OTKa3aTbCX B yqaCTlI1I B .naHHOM orrpoce B JIlo6oe BpeMX
6e3 rrOCJIe.nYIOIU:IIX CaHKUIIll:, qTO BbI rrOJIyqllJIII KOrrllIO .naHHOrO .nOKyMeHTa II qTO BarrIll
3aKOHHble rrpaBa He 6billll HapymeHbI.
TeJI.:
)J;aTa IIHTepBbIO:
Ha3BaHlIe 1I3.naHIIX:
4. CKOJIbKO JIeT BbI 3aHlIMaeTe HaCTOXIU:YID .nOJI:>KHOCTb?
5. B KaKOM ro.ny BbI Haqarrll pa60TaTb rrpo<pecclIoHarrbHbIM, OrrJIaqllBaeMbIM
:>KypHarrllcToM?
3. 3aHlIMaH HaCTOXIU:YIO .nOJI:>KHOCTb BbI:
a) TOJIbKO rrllmeTe CTaTbll
6) rrllmeTe CTaTbll II pe.naKTlIpyeTe MaTepllarrbI .npyrllx :>KypHarrllcTOB
4. KaK qaCTO rry6JIlIKyIOTcx Bamll cTaTbll?
a) e:>Ke.nHeBHO
6) e:>KeHe.neJIbHO
B) e:>KeMeCXqHO
r) pe:>Ke, qeM pa3 B Mecxu
5. KaK qaCTO BbI rrllmeTe 0 rrOJIIITIIKe?
a) pe:>Ke, qeM pa3 B Mecxu
6) e:>KeMeCXqHO
B) e:>KeHe.neJIbHO
r) e:>Ke.nHeBHO
e) .npyroe _
6. 3a rrOCJIe.nHlIe qeTblpe ro.na Barnell: pa60TbI :>KypHarrllcTOM (HaqllHaH C 2006 ro.na)
CJly-qaJIOCh JIH, 'ITO:
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6.1 Pe.n:aKTop y.n:aJUIJI H3 BarneR CTaTbH CJIOBa HJIH cPPa3bI KpHTHKyIDIIIHe
rocy.n:apCTBeHHyID BJIaCTb? ITpHBe.n:HTe rrpHMep.
6.2 ,l.(ml Toro, qTo6bI Barna CTaTMI 6bIJIa orry6JIHKOBaHa, BbI caMOCTOjlTeJIbHO
pernaJIH He BKJIIDqaTb B Hee cPaKTbI, HeraTHBHO xapaKTepH3yIDIIIHe
rocy.n:apCTBeHHyID BJIaCTb? ITpHBe.n:HTe rrpHMep.
6.3 Pe.n:aKTop OTKa3bIBaJICjI «rrporrycKaTb» B rreqaTb Barny CTaTbID, co.n:ep)l(aBrnyID
HHcPopMaUHID, KpHTHKyIDIIIyID rocy.n:apCTBeHHyID BJIaCTb?
7.ITy6JIHKOBaJIH JIH BbI CTaTbH, co.n:ep)l(aIIIHe KPHTHKY rocy.n:apCTBeHHoR BJIaCTH, B
H3.n:aHHH, r.n:e BbI pa60TaeTe? ECJIH .n:a, TO rrpHBe.n:HTe rrpHMep. ECJIH HeT, 06'bjlCHHTe,
rrOqeMy.
8. 3a rrOCJIe.n:HHe qeTblpe ro.n:a pa60TbI (HaqHH~C 2006 ro.n:a) CJIyqaJIOCb JIH, qTO BbI
rry6JIHKOBaJIH B 6JIorax H:JIH B HHTepHeT-pecypcax BarnH CTaTbH, KOTopble He 6bIJIH
orry6JIHKOBaHbI B BarneM H3.n:aHHH rro rrpHqHHe KpHTHqeCKHX 3aMeqaHHR B a.n:pec
BJIaCTeR?
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APPENDIXB
TABLES OF SURVEY RESULTS*
Table 1: Summary of Experience in their Profession
Question Mean Standard N
Deviation
Years in Current Position 5.9 3.9 39
What year did you start working as a journalist 1994.9 7.0 39
Percent writing and editing 60% .49 40
* All tables in the appendix II are based on the survey conducted by me among Russian
(Moscow-based) newspaper journalists in the period of two months (March-April) of
2010. The total number of the respondents is 40 people. The respondents were reached by
phone and interviewed in Russian, all interviews were translated by me into English.
Table 1 is based upon three questions of the survey: "For how many years have you been
working at your current position?" "When (what year) did you start working as a
professional paid journalist?" and "At your current job, you are: a) only writing articles
b) writing articles and editing texts written by other journalists."
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Table 2: The frequency of journalistic publications
How often do your articles appear print?
Daily
Weekly
monthly
Less than once a month
Freq.
21
11
6
2
Percent
52.50
27.50
15.00
5.00
Table 2 shows the frequency ofjournalistic publications and is based on the respondents'
answers to the multiple choice question: "How often do your articles appear in print?"
with possible answers "daily," "weekly," "monthly," "less than once per month."
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Table 3: The percentage ofjoumalists who publish articles critical of the state
Has published articles critical of Freq
the state
Percent
No
yes
2
37
5.13
94.87
Table 3 shows the percentage of the respondents who have written articles critical of the
Russian government. The respondents were asked a yes-no question: "Have you
published articles critical of the Russian government in the outlet you are working for?"
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Table 4: The relationship between journalistic self-censorship and editorial censorship
(cutting or editing political content)
Journalist Engages in
Self-Censorship
Editor Does Not
Censor Political
Content
Editor Censors
Political Content
Total
no
yes
Total
11 7 18
52.38 46.67 50.00
10 8 18
47.62 53.33 50.00
21 15 36
100.00 100.00 100.00
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.1143 Pr = 0.735
Table 4 shows the relationship between journalistic self-censorship and editorial
censorship. It is based upon the answers to the two questions of the survey: "In the last
for years of working as a journalist, has it happened to you that, in order to publish your
article, you yourself decided not to include the facts that are negatively characterizing the
Russian government?" and "In the last four years, has it happened to you that the editor
eliminated from your article any words or phrases criticizing the Russian government?"
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Table 5: The relationship between the journalistic self-censorship and editorial censorship
(refusing to publish the article)
Journalist Engages in Self-
Censorshi
no
yes
Total
Editor Does Not Kill
Article
13
52.00
12
48.00
25
100.00
Editor Kills
Article
5
45.45
6
54.55
11
100.00
Total
18
50.00
18
50.00
36
100.00
Pearson chi2(1)= 0.1309 Pr = 0.717
Table 5 shows the relationship between journalistic self-censorship and editorial
censorship. It is based upon the answers to the two questions of the survey: "In the last
for years of working as a journalist, has it happened to you that, in order to publish your
article, you yourself decided not to include the facts that are negatively characterizing the
Russian government?" and "In the last four years of working as ajoumalist, has it
happened to you that your editor refused to publish your article that contained
infonnation critical of the Russian government?"
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Table 6: The relationship between Soviet-era credentials and self-censorship
Editor Censors Political
Content
no
yes
Total
Post-Soviet Soviet
Credentials Credentials
12 6
46.15 54.55
14 5
53.85 45.45
26 11
100.00 100.00
Total
18
48.65
19
51.35
37
100.00
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.2179 Pr = 0.641
Table 6 shows the relationship between Soviet-era credentials of the journalists and self-
censorship and is based on the questions "For how long have you worked as a
journalist?" and "In the last for years of working as a journalist, has it happened to you
that, in order to publish your article, you yourself decided not to include the facts that are
negatively characterizing the Russian government?"
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Table 7: The relationship between the frequency of publishing articles critical of the state
and the editorial censorship (cutting or editing political content)
Editor Censors Journalist Does Journalist Total
Political Content Not Publish Publishes Articles
Articles Critical of Critical of the
the State State
no 2 21 23
28.57 67.74 60.53
yes 5 10 15
71.43 32.26 39.47
Total
I ~OO.OO 31 38100.00 100.00
Pearson chi2(1) = 3.6673 Pr = 0.055
Table 7 shows the frequency ofpublishing articles critical of the state in relation to
editorial censorship. It is based on the respondents' answers to the questions, "Have you
published articles critical of the Russian government in the outlet you are working for?"
and "In the last for years of working as ajoumalist, has it happened to you that the editor
eliminated from your article any words or phrases criticizing the Russian government?"
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Table 8: Frequency of publishing critical articles on-line
Have you published articles critical of Freq.
the state that you could not publish in
your newspaper in anyon-line
source?
yes 5
no 34
Percent
12.82
87.18
Table 8 shows the frequency of publishing articles critical of the sate on-line. It is based
upon the answers to the yes-no question, "Have you published articles critical of the state
that you could not publish in your newspaper in anyon-line source?"
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Table 9: The relationship between the frequency of the internet publications and
journalistic self-censorship
Journalist self-
censors
no
yes
Total
Pearson chi2(J) =
Have you published articles critical of the state
that you could not publish in your newspaper in
anyon-line source?
yes no Total
1 17 18
20.0 53.12 48.65
4 15 19
80.00 46.88 51.35
5 32 37
100.00 100.00 100.00
1.8994, Pr = 0.168
Table 9 shows the relationship between the frequency of the internet publications and
journalistic self-censorship and is based on the respondents' answers to the questions, "In
the last for years of working as ajournalist, has it happened to you that, in order to
publish your article, you yourself decided not to include the facts that are negatively
characterizing the Russian government" and "Have you published articles critical of the
state that you could not publish in your newspaper in anyon-line source?"
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Table 10: The relationship between the frequency of the internet publications and
editorial censorship (cutting or editing political content)
Editorial censorship Have you published articles critical of the state
that you could not publish in your newspaper in
anyon-line source?
yes no Total
3 20 23
no 60.0 60.61 60.53
yes 2 13 15
40.00 39.39 39.47
Total 5 33 38
100.00 100.00 100.00
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0007, Pr = 0.979
Table 10 shows the relationship between the frequency of the internet publications made
by the respondents and editorial censorship in media outlets they work at. It is based on
the answers to the following questions: "In the last for years of working as ajournalist,
has it happened to you that the editor eliminated from your article any words or phrases
criticizing the Russian government?" and "Have you published articles critical of the
state that you could not publish in your newspaper in anyon-line source?"
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Table 11: The relationship between the legal structure of the outlet and self-censorship
Ownership Proportion
Structure of
Journalists
Reporting
Self-
Censorshi
OAO .5
ZAO .57142857
ANO .66666667
NP .22222222
GOSsob 1
Average* .51351351
*Averages are used here without frequencies to protect the identity ofrespondents.
Table 11 shows the relationship between the legal structure of the outlet and the level of
self-censorship. It is based upon data about the legal ownership structure of the 10 media
outlets applied to in the survey and answers of the respondents to the question: "In the
last for years of working as a journalist, has it happened to you that, in order to publish
your article, you yourself decided not to include the facts that are negatively
characterizing the Russian government?"
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